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2.1  Introduction 
Over the last three decades, giant vertically integrated companies such as 
U.S. Steel, LTV, and Bethlehem and their union counterpart, the United Steel- 
workers of  America (USW), have  faced extreme economic difficulty. Total 
steel sector employment has fallen from 512,000 in 1974 to only 140,000 in 
1992 and many of these so-called integrated firms have filed for bankruptcy, 
permanently closed mills, or  severely curtailed production. These changes 
have caused enormous disruptions, especially in traditional steel-making re- 
gions of the Midwest. 
The integrated industry and its allies have argued that unfair foreign compe- 
tition is the principal source of the industry’s economic decline. This argument 
has been bolstered by the widely acknowledged presence of pervasive foreign 
government steel subsidies, in both the industrialized and developing worlds. 
These subsidies, combined with a structural slowdown in world steel demand, 
have contributed to worldwide overcapacity in steel that persists in 1994. For- 
eign firms, the steel industry has argued consistently, have dealt with this over- 
capacity by “dumping” excess production into the United States. 
The U.S. industry has attempted to secure government intervention to over- 
come the alleged injury caused by these foreign practices. Congress has passed 
certain limited provisions designed to help the industry, but large-scale domes- 
tic intervention has not been forthcoming. Instead, the industry has fGcused 
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most its efforts on arguing for an aggressive unilateral U.S. steel trade policy 
to counter international economic pressures. In pursuing this trade policy goal, 
the integrated industry has used nearly every available path to limit the flow of 
imported steel products into the United States. These avenues have included 
pressuring Congress for direct legislative relief, lobbying the executive branch 
for multilateral steel agreements (MSAs), and, most important, filing literally 
hundreds of petitions under the trade remedy laws. The steel industry’s use of 
the antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws has been particu- 
larly successful, given the extent of foreign subsidies. 
Many outside observers do not dispute the existence of foreign subsidies but 
question their overriding importance. Instead, they point to other origins of the 
U.S. steel sector’s crisis. Crandall(l981) and Adams and Mueller (1986) assert 
that self-inflicted ills and increased domestic competition are the main source 
of the integrated steel industry’s difficulties. Specific problems cited have in- 
cluded slowness to adopt new technologies (such as continuous casting and 
basic-oxygen furnaces), overly generous labor contracts (such as the Experi- 
mental Negotiating Agreement of the 1970s), and outdated management tech- 
niques. Intensified domestic competition has emerged from the expanding im- 
portance  of  domestic  minimills  and  the  growing  number  of  integrated 
competitors. Finally, falling steel demand has caused further deterioration in 
the domestic industry’s economic fortunes. 
The integrated industry has generally won these public policy debates. Over 
the years, a “steel triangle” comprising steelworkers, integrated  steel firms, 
and steel-community congressional representatives has consistently dominated 
steel import policy. The result has been three decades replete with import re- 
strictions of various kinds (see table 2.1),  though with mixed results in perma- 
nently  aiding  the  sector’s competitiveness.  Principal  protectionist  episodes 
have included the 1969 voluntary restraint agreement (VRA), the trigger price 
mechanism (TPM) in the Carter administration, and a series of VRAs negoti- 
ated in the 1980s. Thus, the steel industry has managed to obtain import restric- 
tions from Democratic and Republican administrations, in peace and in war- 
time, and in years of both a growing and a contracting economy. 
A common aspect of these episodes has been that the integrated steel sector 
has  secured intervention  outside the normal  administrative protection  (AP) 
procedures of U.S. trade law. The standard steel industry approach is to use, or 
threaten to use, the relatively nondiscretionary AD and CVD processes as a 
lever to obtain an agreement providing some degree of U.S. price  stability. 
First, integrated steel producers  (often with close cooperation  of the USW) 
file massive petitions under U.S. trade remedy laws, especially AD and CVD 
petitions. Such petitions have particular appeal for the steel industry because 
foreign  practices  have  made  successful  litigation  likely. An  additional  at- 
traction for the steel  sector is that these rules-based  procedures  include no 
presidential discretion whatsoever. Parallel to the trade remedy cases, congres- 








Chronology of Steel Trade Events 
Negotiation of VRAs with European Community and Japan (scheduled to last 
Inauguration of TPM for all steel imports 
Dozens of AD and CVD petitions filed against EC countries 
Negotiation of VRA with European Community (scheduled to last through 
Escape clause petition filed by Bethlehem Steel and USW 
ITC rules affirmatively in the escape clause petition in five of  nine product 
until 1974) 
December 1985) 
categories (affirmative: sheet and strip, plate, structural shapes, wire and wire 
products, and semifinished steel; negative: pipe and tube, bar, rod, and rails) 
September 1984  Negotiation of VRAs on all nine steel products in escape clause petition; 




Candidate Bush promises to continue VRA 
President Bush announces Steel Liberalization Program: (a) 2.5 years VRA 
extension, (b) 1 percent annual increase for countries willing to stop unfair 
practices (up to 20.9 percent by March 1992). and (c) negotiations for MSA 





Termination of VRA; breakdown of MSA over allowable (“green light”) 
AD and CVD petitions filed against flat-rolled products 
ITC rules affirmatively only on a subset of steel industry petitions 
with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Before the quasi- 
judicial AP process can grind to completion and prior to final votes on the 
legislation, the executive branch will urge the steel industry to accept a negoti- 
ated settlement with foreign exporters, usually a VRA. This sequence was re- 
peated with slight variation in  1969, 1977, 1982, and  1984. In essence, the 
rules-based AP procedures have been utilized as a credible threat to force polit- 
ical settlements of steel disputes. 
This impressive string of protectionist victories has led many observers to 
use the steel industry as perhaps the prime example, along with textiles, of  a 
U.S. manufacturing industry whose political clout is so extensive that it can 
“always” obtain protection. “Big Steel,” composed of about a half-dozen verti- 
cally integrated producers and the USW, seemed always capable of profoundly 
influencing steel trade policy. 
Perhaps the most impressive of these trade policy victories came in 1984. 
The industry was  finally able to obtain one of  its important long-term trade 
policy  goals-comprehensive  quotas  on  steel  imports, administered on  a 
country- and product-specific basis. In addition, this decidedly nonmarket out- 
come was wrested from the free-market-oriented Reagan administration. 
Despite the success in securing the global 1984 VRA, evidence will be pre- 
sented below that this managed trade agreement represents the high point of 
the integrated steel sector’s ability to influence trade policy. This is clear from 
two separate outcomes. The first is the battle over the VRA extension in 1989. 76  Michael 0.  Moore 
While the VRA was formally extended for two and a half years, the results 
were hardly what the steel industry wanted. Specifically, the steel industry did 
not  obtain  a five-year extension of the VRA as requested,  did not  obtain a 
tightening of the quota, and, in the event, the VRA was not binding neither on 
a product or country basis for the vast majority of the extension. The second 
piece of evidence of falling political clout is the failure to obtain meaningful 
protection  after the VRA expired in April  1992. The steel industry secured 
neither an extension of  the VRA (a goal  of  the USW) nor an international 
consensus on steel policy through a multilateral steel agreement (a goal of both 
steel producers and the USW). The industry instead was forced to litigate AD 
and CVD cases to final outcomes. Since this is largely an impartial process 
and devoid of obvious means to apply outside pressure, the industry’s choice 
of pursuing a nonpolitical route to its final conclusion also reflects the inte- 
grated steel sector’s self-perception of reduced political clout. In the end, even 
the AP cases were highly unsatisfactory. Contrary to industry expectations, the 
AP route was only partially  successful  in  1993 in securing permanent  high 
duties on foreign steel. Indeed, at the end of  1993, the domestic steel industry 
has less steel protection than at any time since 1977. 
This reduced political influence reflects the radically changed nature of the 
domestic U.S. steel industry. A number of factors stand out. 
First, no longer does a small group of mammoth steel companies dominate 
the domestic market. The fragmentation of the domestic industry has eroded 
one of  the  most  important  traditional  political  advantages  of  the  industry, 
namely, a cohesive coalition with shared interests. 
The most important example of this fragmentation is the growing impor- 
tance of “minimills.” Minimills, a relatively new market form, are small, inno- 
vative  steel  companies  that  use  the  latest  technologies  and  frequently  use 
incentive-based labor compensation schemes with a nonunionized workforce. 
These minimills have been less likely to support specific protection-seeking 
efforts by the integrated firms, especially since they generally produce a differ- 
ent product line than the integrated firms. Thus, minimill and integrated mill 
interests only partially coincide. A further complication for the integrated sec- 
tor’s position is that the CEO of the most successful U.S. minimill (Nucor) is 
a passionate and very vocal free trader. 
The industrial structure of the U.S. industry has been changed further by so- 
called reconstituted mills. These mills have arisen out of integrated firms sell- 
ing off parts of their operations in order to lower costs. Many of these plants 
have continued to operate, thereby creating further competition for the inte- 
grated firms. Finally, a number of foreign steel firms, especially Japanese, have 
purchased  a part or controlling share in integrated firms. Examples include 
NKK’s  purchase  of  a controlling  interest  in  National  Steel  and  Kawasaki 
Steel’s joint ownership of  Armco’s carbon steel division  (US. International 
Trade Commission [USITC] 1989a). 
The restructured U.S. industry is also increasingly competitive internation- 77  The Waning Influence of Big Steel? 
ally, which further weakens the argument that the industry deserves special 
import protection. In the 1980s, integrated firms modernized facilities and the 
USW negotiated wage concessions. In addition, the declining value of the dol- 
lar in the second half of the decade contributed to the U.S. industry’s improved 
international position. 
While the downsized industry has improved its competitive position, the 
declining number of steelworkers has weakened the political base of the steel 
sector in Congress. Many traditional steel-producing cities such as Pittsburgh 
no longer host major integrated steel plants, each of which formerly employed 
thousands of workers. This both reduces the absolute number of steel industry 
voters and lessens the number of congressional districts where steel is an im- 
portant economic factor. 
The other factor is the growing importance of  organized steel-user groups 
lobbying against steel protection.  This occurred  most  prominently  in  1989 
when the integrated industry faced organized domestic opposition in the form 
of the Coalition of American Steel-Using Manufacturers (CASUM), an indus- 
trial steel-user group that argued against the extension of the VRA. They ar- 
gued that the VRA program threatened more American jobs than it protected 
and foreign producers  received extra profits in the quota-protected  market. 
These arguments seem to have been effective, not only on their own merits, 
but also because the politically weakened integrated steel sector was less able 
to dominate the steel import policy discussions. 
The goal of this paper is to document this waning political influence of Big 
Steel, The paper will concentrate on the carbon steel subsector since this is by 
far the largest segment of  the domestic steel industry. However, many of the 
same issues are present in the specialty and stainless steel sectors. 
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. Section 2.2 
will briefly discuss the technical aspects of  the industry that will prove vital 
for later discussion. Section 2.3 will outline a basic political economy frame- 
work used in the analysis. This will include a discussion of the various options 
available to the industry for protection and the relative advantages and disad- 
vantages of  each. A short history of  the steel trade policy and the economic 
conditions of  the steel sector up to 1982 is presented in section 2.4. Section 
2.5 provides a detailed look at the genesis of the 1984 VRA, the battle over the 
1989 extension, the refusal of the Bush administration to extend the VRA in 
1992, and the outcome of  the AD and CVD cases in the summer of  1993. 
Conclusions are provided in section 2.6. 
2.2  Technology and Market Structure of the U.S. Steel Industry 
The market structure of the industry has played a particularly important role 
in the integrated steel sector’s effectiveness in influencing import policy. Most 
important, economies of scale and geographical concentration have resulted in 
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to the basic economic relationships in the industry before discussing the politi- 
cal economy of the steel industry. We will see later that the changing market 
structure of the industry in the  1970s and 1980s has been a critical aspect of 
the industry's declining political power. 
Crude steel is produced by combining iron ore and carbon as well as other 
constituent elements through a number of different processes. Using traditional 
methods, coke (a processed form of coal produced in coke ovens) is combined 
in a blast furnace to produce molten pig iron. Pig iron is then transferred to a 
furnace where other materials are added which results in crude steel. The mol- 
ten crude steel is then cast into ingots, which are rolled into blooms, billets, 
and slabs. These intermediate products are reheated and rolled into final prod- 
ucts such as sheet, bars, and plate. The defining feature of an "integrated"  mill 
is that all of these steps take place at one location. 
Integrated steel making has undergone relatively few major changes in the 
past 40 years. The two most important innovations have been the basic-oxygen 
furnace (BOF), which is more efficient than open-hearth furnaces (OHF), and 
continuous casting, which eliminates the reheating of ingots and intermediate 
rolling (Gold et al. 1984). 
The nature of  the modern integrated steel-making process, which requires 
coke ovens, blast furnaces, BOFs, as well as casting and rolling facilities, cre- 
ates important scale economies. The minimum efficient scale of a new inte- 
grated plant is about 7 million tons of capacity per year, which represents about 
7 percent of total U.S. steel consumption (Barnett and Crandall 1993). Lumpy 
investment and high start-up costs of a new integrated mill obviously act as 
important impediments to entry by new integrated firms. 
High fixed costs also acted as a deterrent to entry in other ways. Specifically, 
integrated firms have strong incentives to maintain high capacity utilization in 
order to keep average costs low. In periods of weak demand, established firms 
therefore will have an incentive to price below average total costs, to the ex- 
treme disadvantage of new entrants. The pressure to compete aggressively on 
price has been a persistent problem of  large-scale steel operations for over a 
century. Consequently, steel firms all over the world have responded to this 
tendency to price below total costs by implementing various methods to main- 
tain price stability. Cartel arrangements, at both the domestic and international 
levels, have been especially important.' 
Another important feature of integrated production has been its geographic 
concentration. Approximately 54 percent of U.S. steel capacity was located in 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana in  1965 (American Iron and Steel Institute 
[AISI], 1969). This pattern  was repeated in the United Kingdom (e.g., Man- 
Chester) and in continental Europe (e.g., the Ruhr valley). The reasons for this 
1. U.S. Steel, for example, used to act as a price leader and residual supplier so that prices would 
not fall in times of low demand. See Adams and Mueller (1 986) for details. For a discussion about 
international cartel arrangements, especially before World War 11,  see Gihghdm  (1991). 79  The Waning Influence of Big Steel? 
Table 2.2  US.  Steel Industry in the Domestic Economy (million tons unless 
otherwise noted) 
Real Domestic 
Total  Apparent  Steel Sector  Steel Sales 
Steel  Import Market  Steel  Final Steel  Employment  (billion 

































































































Sources: AISI (varous issues); Economic Report of  the President (1993). 
5teel/GDP = steel consumption (million tons)/GDP (billion 1987 $). 
concentration were twofold. First, the high costs of transporting iron and coal 
meant that steel facilities clustered in areas with easy access to these raw mate- 
rials. Second, high transportation costs of the finished product made competi- 
tive pricing outside a limited geographical area difficult. 
International trading patterns in steel were affected by transportation costs 
as well. Transoceanic  shipping costs were critical impediments  to imported 
steel's becoming a threat to the U.S. steel industry for many decades. However, 
as these costs fell in the 1960s and war-ravaged industrial economies rebuilt, 
imports into the United States began to rise. As table 2.2 shows, imports, which 
in 1960 reached only 3.3 million tons or 4.7 percent of the U.S. market, soared 
to 17.9 million tons by 1968 and a 16.7 percent domestic market share. 
Despite the growing importance of  foreign steel sources, the large tradi- 
tional steel producers continued their domination of the domestic market for 
many years. Table 2.3 indicates that in 1979 the eight largest integrated steel 
makers  still controlled  nearly  two-thirds of the domestic market.  However, 
technological changes and the low price of scrap steel encouraged the rise of 
minimills in the  1970s. Their emergence would remake the internal market 
structure of the U.S. steel industry. 
Minimills are relatively simple operations, especially in comparison to an 
integrated steelworks. A standard minimill consists of an electric-arc furnace 
(EAF), a continuous caster, and a rolling mill. Minimills do not produce raw 
steel but instead melt  steel scrap using high-temperature EAFs. The molten 
steel is cast and then rolled to produce final steel products in similar fashion 
to an integrated mill. However, because minimills have only recently emerged, 80  Michael 0.  Moore 
Table 2.3  Estimated Market Share of U.S. Participants 
1979  1991 
Number 
of Firms  Shipments 
Share  Number 
(96)  of  Firms  Shipments 
Major integrated mills 
Reconstituted mills 
Other traditional mills 
Minimills 




8  73.4 
0  0 
20  17.7 
48  8.2 




64  5 
0  15 
15  6 
7  52 























Total market  115  100  88.2  100 
Source: World Steel Dynamics (1992). 
Note: Shipments in million tons. 
they use efficient continuous casters almost exclusively, in  stark contrast to 
most older integrated works that continue to produce ingots2 
Because minimills do not actually make steel but instead recycle scrap, they 
do not need expensive coke ovens and blast furnaces and have no incentive to 
locate near iron or coal supplies. The minimum efficient scale for an EAF is 
therefore much  smaller than  for a BOF,  which  lowers capital costs signifi- 
cantly. In fact, few minimill operations have a capacity exceeding  1 million 
tons per year. 
The minimills have differed from their integrated competitors in other im- 
portant ways. Since nearness to iron and coal supplies is irrelevant to minimills, 
they are free to position themselves near the end market, undercutting the inte- 
grated mills further by reducing transportation costs. This means that minimills 
are relatively unconcentrated geographically. This fact, combined with small 
workforces, implies that no community relies on a minimill as a prime source 
of large-scale regional employment, in sharp contrast to the integrated sector. 
Minimills have also adopted new labor and management techniques. Flexi- 
ble  work  rules  and  incentive-based pay  for both  their nonunion  and union 
workforces have reduced unit labor costs and increased productivity. Minimill 
labor costs are lower also because their relatively young workforces result in 
much lower health and pension costs than their integrated rivals that still strug- 
gle with the “legacy” costs of retired production workers (especially after the 
massive layoffs of the 1980s). The low capital costs also allow the minimills 
to build plants with relatively short lifespans, thereby allowing for more timely 
introduction of new technologies (Barnett and Crandall 1986, 20). 
The success of the minimills in the U.S. market has been remarkable. Table 
2. For a comparison of  minimill and integrated mill production techniques, see Hogan (1987). 81  The Waning Influence of  Big Steel? 
2.3 indicates that, according to one estimate, minimills were shipping 8.2 mil- 
lion tons of  steel in  1979. This represented  7 percent of the U.S. domestic 
market. By  1991, minimill shipments had risen to 21.3 million tons and 24 
percent of the market. This increased market share came almost exclusively at 
the expense of the integrated sector. Major and minor integrated firms repre- 
sented 79 percent of the market in 1979 but fell to 63 percent in 1991. Imports, 
on the other hand, grew from only 15 percent to 18 percent of the U.S. market. 
Profit rates for the minimill sector have also been very impressive. Minimills 
have operated more profitably than the integrated sector in every year for which 
disaggregated data are available. In addition, the industrywide figures indicate 
that, while the integrated firms lost money in 1985, 1986, and 1991, minimills 
were posting net gains in each year. This general pattern was also true in the 
early  1980s, when  minimills  were more profitable than  integrated  mills  in 
head-to-head competition in individual product categories (USITC 1984). 
Minimills  have traditionally  been  “niche”  producers.  They have focused 
their efforts on “long” products such as wire, rod, and bars. The cost advantage 
of the minimills has led to near domination of these product lines. For example, 
estimates in table 2.4 indicate that the minimill share of  domestic wire rod 
shipments will grow from 86 percent in  1990 to 100 percent by 2000. 
Despite these important cost advantages, significant constraints have pre- 
cluded the minimills from repeating this success in other product lines. The 
most important constraint is the use of scrap as a feedstock. This leads to more 
impurities in the final product than in steel produced by integrated mills. This 
lower quality of  output has dramatically reduced the use of minimill steel in 
flat-rolled products destined for home appliances and automobile bodies. Con- 
sequently, integrated firms have continued to dominate the domestic shipments 
of these high value-added “flat” products. 
Unfortunately for the integrated mills, recent technological advances mean 
Table 2.4  Estimated Minimill Share of Domestic Productiona 
(by product category) 












































Source: Donald Barnetficonomic Associates Inc. 
‘Minimill figures include some independent firms that do not use EAFS 82  Michael 0.  Moore 
that minimills may soon be able to compete effectively in flat-rolled products 
as well. Some minimills have begun  to experiment with the use of  directly 
reduced iron and iron carbide as feedstocks, both of which reduce reliance on 
scrap and significantly increase the quality of  EAF output. New  techniques 
such as thin-slab casting will also increase the ability of minimills to produce 
sheet and plate competitively. For example, Nucor inaugurated a 1 million ton 
sheet mill using thin-slab casters in 1989 and followed with another sheet mill 
in Hickman, Arkansas, that will produce 2 million tons per year by the end of 
1994 (Financial Times, July 8, 1993)’  Many analysts see continued  strong 
performance  of  the  minimills  in  the  flat-rolled  market.  Minimill  operators 
themselves predicted  in  1993 that up to 45 percent of the flat-rolled market 
would be provided by EAF minimill operations by 2001 (Iron  Age 1993). 
In summary, the internal market structure of the U.S. steel sector has under- 
gone substantial evolution over the last two decades. Minimills have created 
enormous pressure on the integrated mills and have almost completely driven 
the  major  firms out of  the  long-product  markets.  The traditional  integrated 
firms having increasingly retreated into flat products. Continued technological 
progress may mean that the integrated sector will soon be forced to compete 
with minimills in this end of the market as well. 
The rise of the minimill, in essence, has created a steel sector much more in 
line with economists’ vision of  a competitive market. The dramatic drop in 
entry and exit costs means  that the U.S.  steel sector now hosts many more 
competitors. Economies of  scale have also become much less important. As 
we will see in sections 2.4 and 2.5 below, this changing domestic market struc- 
ture has begun to have a significant influence on the integrated mills’ ability to 
shape steel trade policy. 
2.3  The Political Economy of Integrated Steel Lobbying 
2.3.1  General Political Economy Framework 
An agent’s influence over public policy depends largely on its ability to con- 
solidate and apply political pressure, the strength of  potential opposition, and 
the available policy options under a nation’s institutional and legal structures. 
An intervention-seeking agent would prefer a policy so narrowly  defined 
that only that agent receives it. In the case of a firm, this might be a firm- 
specific tax break or subsidy. This would clearly result in higher returns relative 
to all of the firm’s competitors. However, since only one firm receives the inter- 
vention’s  advantages, the obvious difficulty with this strategy is that the firm 
3. With the expansion of the Hickman and Crawfordsville plants, Nucor will become the third 
largest steel firm  in the United States, after US. Steel and Bethlehem. 83  The Waning Influence of Big Steel? 
must rely exclusively on its own political muscle to secure the benefit. Very 
few agents will have enough influence to accomplish this alone. 
Usually, agents are forced instead  to form multimember coalitions.“ The 
most  obvious advantages  of  such coalitions  are that  lobbying  costs can be 
shared  and  large  numbers  of  coalition  members translate  into  significant 
ballot-box clout in a majority-vote-based  democracy. 
There are, however,  certain  important  disadvantages  of  large  coalitions. 
First, the coalition must identify others with common interests. The larger the 
number of possible coalition members, the more costly are efforts to identify 
and organize them. Many coalition members also create monitoring burdens- 
each individual member will have an incentive to shirk on lobbying efforts but 
still retain the benefits of the coalition’s lobbying. The possibility of free rider- 
ship makes lobbying a less attractive option since the net benefits of the lob- 
bying efforts will be less the fewer the numbers of effort-contributing  indi- 
viduals. 
The coalition’s success also depends on its cohesiveness and permanence. 
Do the members cooperate on a permanent  basis or do they constantly  shift 
alliances? The more often  that the members act in concert, the more likely 
that each member can develop a reputation and be able to exclude shirkers. In 
addition, permanent  alliances have the political advantage that they are more 
predictable to vote-seeking politicians who need not try  to predict the coali- 
tion’s  strength or policy  position.  The political  strength  and positions  of  a 
newly formed or ad hoc coalition, on the other hand, are much more difficult 
to predict. It will be difficult both to gauge the new group’s political muscle 
and whether the coalition will remain intact after the immediate policy issue 
is resolved. 
One solution to these transaction  costs is to create permanent  institutions 
that represent the affected members’ interests. Examples include trade associa- 
tions for industry  groups and a union  for workers.  Payment of  dues to the 
association will help overcome free-rider problems. In addition, members only 
need organize the association once; subsequently, it will act as the coalition’s 
representative so that individual members need not reassemble on each issue 
to reach decisions. 
A particularly important source of coalition cohesion is immobility of fac- 
tors in an indu~try.~  Factor immobility means that all industry participants (la- 
bor, management, stockholders, etc.) will find that their economic interests are 
4.  For the classic treatment of lobbying in multimember coalitions, see Olson (1971). 
5.  A factor may be incapable of  moving to another industry if the factor has some industry- 
specific attributes. In the case of capital, the  machinery may be specialized so that it is useless in 
other production processes. Similarly, a worker may have developed human capital that cannot be 
easily transferred to another sector. Factors also may be immobile out of choice-if  a factor is 
gaining rents (i.e., payment above the next best opportunity), that factor may be highly resistant to 
moving to another, lower-paying, industry. 84  Michael 0.  Moore 
closely tied to the industry’s economic health. If the price of the output rises, 
incomes for all immobile factors in the industry will rise as well. If the price 
falls or the price of intermediate inputs rises, the factors suffer a real income 
loss. 
Another  way  to  think  usefully  about  this  immobile-factors  model  is  in 
simple partial equilibrium terms. An increase in the price of an imported prod- 
uct will result in an increase in “producer surplus,” or payments to those em- 
ployed in the import-competing industry. The price increase also means that 
domestic consumers of the product will pay more for the product and suffer a 
loss in “consumer surplus.” The lasting impact of  this price increase on the 
consumer will depend in part on the characteristics of the product. If the prod- 
uct is a final consumption good, then the consumer may be forced to bear much 
of the price increase. The effects are more subtle for a protected intermediate 
input. In particular,  if  the consuming industry can pass  along the increased 
input costs to its own final consumers, then intermediate input protection will 
be less damaging. The consuming industry will consequently be unlikely  to 
lobby against the import protection. If instead the consuming industry is a price 
taker in its market, it will be forced to absorb the cost increases and will be 
more likely to resist protection. An example of such an industry would be one 
that competes on a world market as a price taker. 
An industry with immobile factors also has a number of distinct advantages 
when confronting the transaction costs of coalition building identified above. 
Specifically, coalitions based on fixed factors have low organizing costs since 
potential coalition partners are easily identifiable. In addition, specific factors 
are familiar to each other since they are “permanently” in the same industry 
and deal with each other on many policy and economic issues (e.g., collective 
bargaining). The familiarity translates into established reputations. These per- 
manently intertwined interests mean that coalition members are less likely to 
take different positions on other issues facing the industry as a whole. They 
will have strong economic incentives to ensure that the industry’s economic 
pie is as large as possible.6 
The consequences of immobile factors for lobbying effort should be clear. 
The more immobile the factors, the more likely that those factors will have 
strong incentives to protect the economic interests of the industry as a whole. 
In addition, the more closely associated the factor is with the industry, the more 
likely the benefits to lobbying for the industry will outweigh the transaction 
costs of lobbying. If, on the other hand, factors are mobile, their economic 
interests will generally not be identifiable with a particular  industry. Conse- 
6.  This cooperation clearly need not extend to intraindustry issues such as arguments over labor 
contracts, profit sharing, etc. In other words, the fixed factors are likely to be extremely quarrel- 
some when trying to divide up any benefits that they have won through their cooperation on help- 
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quently, they would be less likely to expend any resources lobbying  on the 
industry’s behalf.7 
The presence of immobile factors not only provides  political strength by 
encouraging the growth of a coalition. It also provides clear signals to politi- 
cians seeking to represent their constituents’ interests. The reason is that the 
degree of  mobility will help  determine  whether factors in an industry will 
speak with “one voice.” Immobile factors will generally have an economic 
incentive to do so, which will help an elected representative avoid choosing to 
support one constituent group over another.* 
2.3.2  Application to the Integrated Steel Sector 
The highly effective coalition that has developed over the last few decades 
to limit  steel imports has attributes consistent with the  successful lobbying 
characteristics described above. The outstanding feature of the effort has been 
the stability of the alliance between integrated steel firms and the steelworkers’ 
union. The most important sources of the steel coalition’s integrity have been 
the relatively  small number of actors in the group and the immobility of the 
factors employed in the integrated industry. These two elements have allowed 
the industry to consistently overcome the transaction costs of  organizing an 
coalition to fight for import barriers. 
As outlined in section 2.2 above, the basic economics of the integrated steel 
sector has contributed greatly to the small number of actors in the traditional 
industry. As late as 1979, eight producers controlled nearly two-thirds of the 
domestic market. In addition, the integrated firms had a tradition of cooperat- 
ing on cartel pricing schemes and had a well-functioning, established trade 
association in the AISI. The steel sector also was highly unionized through a 
single union representative,  the USW. The existence of  these two institutions 
means that organization costs for lobbying efforts could be kept reasonably 
low and also significantly reduced the likelihood of free riders within the inte- 
grated sector. The actors in the AISI and USW were also quite familiar to one 
another, either  through  the trade association, collective bargaining  arrange- 
ments, or cooperation on other steel-related public policy issues. The combina- 
tion of familiarity among the steel sector actors and their relatively small num- 
ber translated into an effective lobbying coalition. 
The immobility of steel industry inputs also enhances coalition building in 
favor of protection. Capital is highly specialized in the steel industry and gen- 
erally very long lived. The relatively unskilled nature of steelworker tasks and 
higher than normal compensation for the manufacturing sector mean that eco- 
7. An  intermediate case where some factors are mobile and others immobile can be found in 
Mussa (1974). For an  extension of this framework to a model with voting behavior in a formal 
political economy framework, see Mayer (1984). 
8. A former trade official with the US.  government has indicated in an interview that an industry 
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nomic rents can be substantial for steelworkers. Steel industry wages have con- 
sistently been much higher than average manufacturing wages. This suggests 
that steelworkers have strong incentives to resist transfer to other occupations. 
This immobility provides further incentives for steelworkers and capital own- 
ers to work together to obtain protection. It also leads to stability of the rela- 
tionships, which in turn helps the AISI and USW work together effectively. 
Labor-management cohesion has also helped the integrated steel sector at- 
tract congressional support that is highly effective. This support is decidedly 
nonpartisan and organized along geographical lines. Prominent industry allies 
have included both Democrats (e.g., Representative  Murtha of  Pennsylvania 
and Senator Rockefeller of West Virginia) and Republicans (e.g., Representa- 
tive Schulze and Senator Heinz, both of Pennsylvania). The tendency to have 
strong political support from district- and state-based politicians has been fur- 
ther strengthened by the traditional  industry’s geographic concentration. The 
large number of workers concentrated in a few districts and states with many 
electoral votes leads to substantial political leverage, not only in Congress, but 
potentially in presidential elections as well. 
The traditional inability of domestic steel-using industries to organize effec- 
tively stands in stark contrast to the integrated sector. Their weaknesses are 
mirror images of Big Steel’s strengths. Most important, the costs of steel pro- 
tection are widely dispersed across user industries, While protection can raise 
the costs of steel significantly, steel generally represents only a modest portion 
of  most industries’  total input costs. Further impediments  include large or- 
ganizing costs arising out of the large number of firms that use steel as an input. 
This raises the likelihood of free riding, which further discourages coalition 
building. Finally, steel users do not have a set of common interests other than 
steel around which to ~rganize.~  Consequently, any effort to fight steel protec- 
tion is almost necessarily  ad hoc. This combination of factors means that a 
coalition against steel protection is unlikely to form and, if it does coalesce, is 
highly unstable. Finally, the geographical dispersion of steel-using industries 
has meant that there are few congressional districts where steel users are as 
important economically as a full-scale integrated steelworks might be. This 
creates less direct congressional support for steel-using industries in their fight 
against protection. 
2.3.3 
The  steel  industry,  as  any  other  U.S.  import-competing  industry,  must 
choose among a host of  options when pursuing government  intervention. A 
particular option will be considered only if its benefits, weighted by the proba- 
bility of success, outweigh the costs of seeking government help. If a number 
Choosing the Avenue to Protection 
9. In a 1978 steel trade conference, a representative of a major steel-consuming firm noted that 
“to represent adequately the viewpoints of  a wide range of  [steel-using] industries is manifestly 
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of choices are individually potentially profitable, the industry must then choose 
the option or combination of options that maximizes expected profits.  lo 
The choices available to an integrated steel firm seeking government inter- 
vention can be divided into two distinct categories, each with its own advan- 
tages and disadvantages. These options include assistance to the integrated sec- 
tor as a whole and assistance to the entire domestic steel industry.” 
The former option is clearly the more attractive. A strategy  directed nar- 
rowly at the integrated sector not only will help the integrated sector compete 
with imports but also will not benefit the minimill  sector. Examples of such 
intervention  include  changing  the relative  regulatory  environment  (e.g., re- 
laxing pollution requirements for the BOFs used by the integrated firms but 
maintaining them for EAFs used by  minimills), changing the relative  price 
of  intermediate inputs (e.g.,  raising  the price of electricity, which will hurt 
minimills), or changing the relative labor costs (e.g., by reducing the legacy 
costs of retired production workers, a problem much more severe for the more 
mature integrated sector than for minimills with their younger  worktorces). 
Unfortunately for the integrated firms, most of these efforts to obtain direct 
benefits have had only limited success.12 
The integrated firms have been much more successful in obtaining import 
barriers. Import restrictions, however, have the major drawback that all domes- 
tic  import-competing  firms in  the protected  industry  are equally benefited, 
whether or not they have contributed to the lobbying effort to secure the restric- 
tions.’j In the steel industry context, this means that minimills have an incen- 
tive to free ride on the efforts of the integrated sectocL4  Even if the integrated 
producers can narrow the protection to flat-rolled products, where they domi- 
nate, the increase in profits will provide further incentive for minimills to solve 
the technological barriers blocking their entrance into these product lines. 
Has the integrated steel industry irrationally pursued free-rider-producing 
import barriers that help their strongest competitors, domestic minimills? The 
answer would  seem to be “no.” While the benejts of  interventions  directed 
solely at the integrated sector are larger than those from protection, one must 
also consider other factors when comparing the two paths. In particular, import 
protection in the United States has two major advantages: (1) the cost of pursu- 
ing protection, especially administered protection, is low relative to lobbying 
10. See Moore and Suranovic (1992) for an analysis of the welfare implications of an industry 
choosing between multiple paths to protection. 
11. A third option, firm-specific interventions, are the most advantageous to an individual steel 
producer. As discussed above, these are so difficult to obtain that we ignore them here. 
12. Examples of  domestic interventions that have helped the integrated sector relative to the 
minimill sector include “safe harbor” tax  deductions in  the  1981 Reagan tax plan, transitional 
“carryback” rules in the  1986 Tax Reform Act, and limited research and development subsidies 
for integrated steel making. For details, see US.  Congress, Congressional Budget Office (1987). 
13. For a discussion about the free-rider problem of  tariffs and lobbying, see Rodrik (1986). 
14. See Lenway and Schuler (1991) for an empirical analysis of integrated vs. minimill lobbying 
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for subsidies and (2) the probability  of  obtaining protection  is much higher 
than receiving direct government subsidies. 
Lobbying costs in the AP process are relatively  low mainly because they 
involve permanent government institutions whose procedures are standardized 
and transparent. The domestic industry need only file a petition and assemble 
supporting materials for an import remedy case and let the government incur 
the balance of the costs. While these AP transaction costs can be quite substan- 
tial (and have run into millions of dollars for the steel industry), the costs are 
known with relative certainty before the effort is begun. 
Lobbying  for direct  intervention,  on the other hand,  potentially  involves 
much more extensive effort and cost. Most important, domestic intervention 
requires the passage of separate legislation or convincing the executive branch 
to reinterpret existing law. Constructing a legislative majority to pass new leg- 
islation requires extensive effort and also may open the intervention-seeking 
industry to the charge that it is receiving special favors. Subsidies are espe- 
cially problematic since they involve a direct transfer from domestic taxpayers 
to the industry. Reinterpretation of existing law is perhaps less difficult, but the 
industry still must have considerable political muscle to convince the executive 
branch and/or the bureaucracy  to change existing regulatory practices. Lob- 
bying for direct relief  can also be open ended; no one can know how many 
resources are necessary to persuade legislators to pass a new law or to convince 
administrators to change existing procedures. 
Another important advantage of import barriers is that protection  seekers 
can characterize the argument as a choice between helping domestic citizens 
or foreigners. Protection seekers will argue that opponents are abandoning do- 
mestic interests in favor of foreign suppliers. Vote-seeking domestic politicians 
will likely ignore the effects on foreign suppliers’ welfare and will concentrate 
solely on the “benefits” of protection unless domestic consumers can organize 
effectively. This dynamic changes considerably if the debate concerns a purely 
domestic intervention. In this case, the arguments are necessarily about inter- 
nal domestic distribution of income. A subsidy to one industry means that tax- 
payers must pay and the industry gets special benefits not offered to other sec- 
tors. This implies that the political debate will be among competing domestic 
constituencies, which raises considerably the political costs of supporting one 
industry. 
Consequently, there are strong incentives for the steel industry to pursue a 
trade-related remedy. The most important trade options include: (1) an unfair 
trade remedy petition, (2) an escape clause petition, and (3) a VRA.15 
Two types of unfair trade remedies are available for an import-competing 
firm. The first is the AD process wherein a domestic firm accuses a foreign 
15. Other possible remedies include relief under section 406 (Market Disruption from State 
Trading Countries), section 301 (Unfair Foreign Trade Practices), and section 232 (National Secu- 
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firm of either selling in the U.S. market below fully allocated cost (i.e., average 
total costs) or selling in the U.S. below the price charged in the exporter’s 
home market. The second remedy is the CVD process. In these petitions, the 
domestic firms allege that a foreign government has provided a grant or sub- 
sidy that was intended specifically to increase exports. 
Each AD and CVD petition is product and country specific. If two slightly 
different steel products  are allegedly dumped by  five  separate countries, 10 
separate petitions are filed, each of which in principle is adjudicated indepen- 
dently and may receive a separate dumping or subsidy margin. 
Under U.S. procedures,  the Department of  Commerce (DOC) determines 
the dumping or subsidy margin while the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(ITC) rules whether the domestic industry is “materially” injured by “reason 
of” the unfair trade imports. Since 1980,  both agencies are also subject to strict 
statutory deadlines for completion of their investigations. 
The AD and CVD procedures progress in a staggered fashion. The ITC first 
issues a preliminary material injury decision. If the ITC decision is affirmative, 
the DOC calculates a preliminary  dumping or subsidy margin. If  the DOC 
rules affirmatively at its preliminary stage, imports must pay a bond equal to 
the estimated dumping or subsidy margin. This bond is adjusted in a final DOC 
determination and becomes a definitive duty only if  the ITC rules in a final 
decision that the dumped or subsidized imports are causing “material” injury. 
In addition, once the duty is in place, the duty has no specific expiration date. 
In fact, a number of U.S. AD duties have been in place for over 20 years. 
These procedures  offer  a number  of  distinct  advantages  to intervention- 
seeking firms. For example, the interests of consumers of the imported good 
are entirely absent from the unfair trade process. The responsible agencies look 
only at unfair trade margins and injury-no  account is made for the costs of 
imposing retaliatory duties. In addition, the process is relatively automatic and 
free from overt political considerations; if the DOC and ITC rule affirmatively 
at a final stage, the final estimated duty is imposed without any direct involve- 
ment of  either the president or any other elected official. This process is, by 
design, supposed to be a rules-based, nondiscretionary procedure that is im- 
mune to political influence. There is considerable evidence that the ITC deci- 
sion process in particular is remarkably impervious to outside pressures.16  Fi- 
nally, the chances of receiving a positive dumping or subsidy margin from the 
DOC are quite high because of a number of arguably biased procedures.’’ 
The AD and CVD processes also offer specific benefits to the integrated 
16. There have been a number of empirical studies that have examined whether political pressure 
can influence ITC decisions. Most authors have found that the ITC basically uses economic criteria 
consistent with  the law in voting on material injury (see, e.g., Devault 1993; Anderson  1993). 
Moore (1992) also finds such economic factors are preeminent but finds weak evidence that Senate 
oversight committees may affect the ITC’s decisions. Devault and Anderson, using more recent 
data, find no such evidence. 
17. Over the 1980s, over 90 percent of all petitions resulted in a positive margin at the prelimi- 
nary andor final stage. This is at least in part a reflection of upwardly biased procedures used by 90  Michael 0.  Moore 
steel industry. Perhaps most important, there is general recognition that there 
has been widespread government intervention in steel markets.IX  While there 
is considerable dispute about the actual effects of these subsidies on the US. 
steel industry, their existence makes positive subsidy margin calculations by 
the DOC quite likely. In addition, positive AD duties are also highly probable 
since, as discussed in section 2.2, integrated firms with high fixed costs will 
often sell below average total costs in recessions. 
The steel industry also can use the product- and industry-specific nature of 
the AD and CVD processes to its advantage. By nature, steel output is highly 
differentiated. Steel products contain varying levels of alloys and can be heat- 
treated, cold- or hot-rolled, carbon or stainless. The differentiated nature of the 
products,  combined  with  the  large  number  of  countries  that  export to  the 
United States, means that the steel industry may choose to file a large number 
of petitions simultaneously. 
Another important advantage of  using the AD and CVD processes is the 
rhetorical high ground that they afford. Since both involve allegations of “un- 
fair” foreign trade practices, industry representatives  and their political allies 
can claim that the industry does not seek protection but instead only consider- 
ation of legitimate grievances. Allegations of unfair trading practices can also 
help blunt complaints that intervention is being awarded to a noncompetitive 
industry. 
There are, however, certain major disadvantages to the unfair trade remedy 
procedures. Perhaps most important, the unfair trade remedies may offer only 
limited protection since only a subset of countries may finally be “convicted,” 
This leaves open the possibility of supply diversion from unfettered exporters. 
The second disadvantage, at least for a politically powerful industry, is that the 
bureaucratic  nature  of  the  process  limits  direct  lobbying.  In  addition,  the 
product- and  country-specific nature of the  petitions means that  substantial 
legal costs are necessary since separate cases must be litigated. 
The second major option for import restrictions is an escape clause petition. 
In an escape clause case, the ITC determines  whether imports  have been a 
substantial  cause of  serious, as opposed to material, injury. If the ITC rules 
affirmatively, it makes recommendations to the president about temporary pro- 
tection. The president then must decide within a specific time period whether 
to accept, modify, or reject the ITC’s recommendation. If protection  is forth- 
coming, then across-the-board restrictions are imposed on all countries’ ex- 
ports of the affected product. Since there is no allegation of unfair trade, the 
exporting country in principle is offered compensation in the form of lowered 
the DOC in calculating the margins. See the contributions in Boltuck and Litan (1991) for a thor- 
ough discussion of  these procedures. 
18. These actions include a steel-led development strategy in many developing countries (e.g., 
Brazil) and extensive EC attempts to rationalize the steel industry through subsidies, guaranteed 
loans, input subsidies, guaranteed minimum prices, and production quotas (Howell, Noellert, and 
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tariffs  on other products.  If  the  United  States offers  no compensation,  the 
GATT recognizes the right of the exporting nation to raise tariffs on U.S. ex- 
ports in retaliation. 
As with the AD and CVD processes, the escape clause offers both advan- 
tages and disadvantages to an intervention-seeking industry. The two most im- 
portant advantages are: (1) the protection is comprehensive and (2)  no unfair 
trade practices need be proved. In addition, the legal costs are potentially lower 
since only one determination must be made for the entire industry and not for 
individual products and exporters. 
There are, however, important potential drawbacks. First, the industry faces 
a higher injury  standard at the ITC than with unfair trade  cases (serious as 
opposed to material injury). Second, and more important, the president has 
final discretion about the implemented policy. The president can reject the ITC 
recommendation for any reason deemed important to the national interest, in- 
cluding foreign policy concerns or national economic interests. This discretion 
also allows the president to weigh consumer interests in the decision. Third, 
the protection-seeking industry will benefit, but potentially only at the clear 
expense of another domestic industry because if the president offers protection 
under the escape clause, he must offer compensation by lowering other import 
barriers or face increased duties on another U.S. industry’s exports. Either way, 
another U.S.  industry must “pay” for the  protection. This will  increase the 
political  cost to the president of accepting an affirmative  ITC decision  and 
make protection less likely to be granted. 
Finally, an industry seeking trade protection can try to engineer a settlement 
completely outside of the normal U.S. trade policy framework. The most im- 
portant  example  of  this  for an  import-competing  industry  has  come to be 
VRAs. Under such a quantitative restriction, foreign exporters agree to limit 
their exports to the United States, usually in exchange for the domestic industry 
refraining from filing trade remedy petitions. The foreign firms receive guaran- 
teed  access  to  the  protected  market  and  hence  will  receive  higher  profit 
margins. 
A VRA has a number of  attributes advantageous to a protection-seeking 
firm. Most important, the VRA is a quota and thus leads to highly predictable 
ceilings on foreign competition. VRAs are also not subject to GATT rules so 
that issues of  MFN  treatment  of  imports,  compensation  for raising  GATT- 
bound tariffs, and injury determinations are all irrelevant. In addition, foreign- 
ers will often cooperate in negotiating a VRA since compensation in the form 
of quota rents is transferred to foreign firms. 
A VRA’s  major disadvantage to the integrated steel sector is that it, like 
all comprehensive import restrictions, will aid free-riding domestic firms. In 
addition, unless the VRA is implemented on a narrowly defined product basis, 
foreign firms will have an incentive  to upgrade  to higher value-added  steel 
products. Finally, unless all foreign suppliers are included, a VRA may simply 
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2.3.4 
The determination of the final intervention level depends on two factors. The 
first is what intervention is being considered,  and the second is the relative 
political strengths of the opponents and proponents of the intervention. 
If US. unfair trade procedures are the basis of the intervention, the level of 
protection is determined exclusively by the dumping or subsidy margin. This 
leaves little or no room for discretion or political lobbying over the precise 
duty. 
There is substantially more discretion under the escape clause and under a 
VRA. The president explicitly considers factors other than injury to the import- 
competing industry in an escape clause petition. The president may also mod- 
ify the ITC’s recommendation  in any  way  he deems appropriate.  Similarly, 
since a VRA  is negotiated,  the level of  protection  is necessarily a political 
decision. Since both the escape clause and a VRA allow political actors to play 
a role, unlike an unfair trade case, the final intervention level will depend on 
the relative strengths of opponents and proponents of protection. One would 
expect therefore that politically powerful industries would seek to obtain pro- 
tection  through  either  a VRA or escape clause.  Politically  weak  industries 
would opt instead for AD and CVD  procedure^.'^ 
Determination of the Intervention Level 
2.4  Steel Trade Policy prior to 1982 
The U.S. integrated  steel industry reached  the height  of  its power in the 
immediate postwar period. During the 1940s and 1950s, the industry invested 
in new and larger-scale OHF capacity to keep up with wartime demand and 
the postwar consumer boom. This investment solidified the large integrated 
firms’ lead over both smaller domestic mills and foreign firms in Europe and 
Japan still struggling with war-ravaged plant and equipment. The industry was 
therefore able to maintain healthy profits, keep imports low, and be the world’s 
leading steel exporter. 
This period of Big Steel economic dominance was accompanied by a highly 
antagonistic relationship between the U.S. government and the steel firms. The 
large integrated firms, especially  U.S.  Steel, were frequently accused of op- 
erating a domestic cartel and were targets of antitrust rhetoric, if not action. 
Specific  complaints emerged from  the  Kefauver  Committee in  Congress, 
which claimed that “steel prices since 1947 have moved steadily and regularly 
in one direction, upward,” even in the midst of a recession (Adams and Mueller 
1986). The highly charged atmosphere perhaps reached  its peak during the 
Korean War when President Truman unsuccessfully  attempted to nationalize 
19. Finger, Hall, and Nelson (1982) have distinguished these two as the “political track” and the 
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the steel industry in  1952. Confrontations continued in 1962 when President 
Kennedy challenged steel company executives over price increases. Nonethe- 
less, the integrated firms’ ability to dominate the domestic market was largely 
untouched until the mid-1960s. 
The seeds of the destruction of the oligopolistic control over the U.S. steel 
market were sown at the end of the 1950s. In particular, significant steel im- 
ports began in 1959 when a 116-day strike severely reduced the domestic avail- 
ability of steel. Domestic steel-using firms, especially in the automobile indus- 
try, were forced to look for the first time to foreign suppliers as an important 
source of  steel. Soon afterward, the United  States became a permanent  net 
importer of steel. 
As the  1960s wore on, high prices and high demand in the United States 
caused import market share to surge from 7.3 percent in 1964 to 16.7 percent 
in 1968. This increase was partly the result of new and efficient foreign produc- 
tion facilities. New European and Japanese capacity, for example, utilized re- 
cently developed BOFs, which were significantly more efficient than the plant 
introduced in the United States a mere 15 years earlier. An overvalued dollar 
and low wage rates, especially in Japan, were other important factors in the 
declining competitiveness of U.S. steel. Finally, foreign exports were also en- 
couraged by government support, most notably in Japan. The Japanese govern- 
ment singled out the steel industry as particularly important in its drive to in- 
dustrialize the nation (see Howell et al. 1988 for details). 
The reaction of integrated producers and the USW to the new competitors 
was to call for import restrictions. During the late days of the Johnson presi- 
dency, the administration gave in to the pressure and negotiated in  1969 the 
first of many VRAs with the European Community and Japan. In exchange, 
the U.S. steel producers agreed not to pursue administered protection and fur- 
thermore argued that they would use the protection to modernize their plants 
to compete more effectively with imports. 
These agreements, however, provided only limited comprehensive import 
protection. While the VRAs restricted both the European Community and Ja- 
pan  to  an  overall  import  level  of  5.8  million  tons  of  steel  annually, the 
agreements did not specify the product mix. Consequently, exporters were free 
to upgrade to higher  value-added products,  especially from carbon steel to 
specialty steels. In addition, other countries moved in to replace the displaced 
Japanese and European  steel exports since the quotas were not global. The 
VRAs  remained  in  force through  1974, when  rising  steel  demand  abroad 
reduced steel exports to the United States. 
This reduction in import pressure was soon followed by the 1974-75 world- 
wide recession. Most of world’s steel firms interpreted the recession as a nor- 
mal cyclical downturn and continued to install new plant. Japanese gross steel- 
making capacity expanded from 138 million metric tons in 1974 to 157 million 
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increased steel-making capacity from  178 million to 203 million metric tons 
in 1979. U.S. steel capacity, on the other hand, remained essentially flat during 
this period (World Steel Dynamics 1994). 
It is clear ex post that the recession  of  1974 was also accompanied by  a 
structural shift in world steel demand. Thus, the decisions to continue to add 
new capacity resulted in vast world overcapacity  in steel. Figure 2.1 shows 
how production capacity in the Western world continued to increase after 1974 
even as production fell off strongly from the trend line of the pre- 1974 period. 
Continued substantial intervention  by  many nations’  governments  exacer- 
bated this overcapacity. After the onset of the crisis in 1974, Western European 
nations  with  significant public ownership of  steel  firms (especially France, 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Italy) provided subsidies to slow plant clo- 
sures. Other EC nations with privately owned firms, especially Germany and 
the Netherlands, were bitterly opposed to this direct state aid. After an initial 
attempt to reconcile these differences under the first Davignon Plan, the situa- 
tion deteriorated sufficiently in 1980 when some nations seriously considered 
intra-EC bamers in steel, previously  unthinkable in the “Common Market.” 
The European Commission subsequently proclaimed a “manifest crisis” and 
enforced mandatory production quotas and, later, mandatory minimum prices 
for all steel products.  The commission also closely monitored and approved 
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Fig. 2.1  Western world effective steel capacity and production 
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Fig. 2.2  Distribution of western world steel capacity 
Source: World Steel Dynamics ( 1994). 
firm  investment decisions  and endorsed certain  state aid to help relieve  the 
crisis situation (Tsoukalis and Schwartz 1985). Nevertheless, significant differ- 
ences in steel sector subsidies remained among the EC nations. As we will see, 
U.S.  firms used  the differential  rates of  intervention  and the threat  of  near 
chaos in the European steel sector to its clear advantage in  1982 when they 
filed for protection under the AD and CVD laws. 
After the mid-I970s, other countries provided  subsidies for new capacity 
rather  than  for  covering  operating losses  as  in  Europe.  Governments  in 
the developing world were especially  aggressive in adding to new capacity. 
Notable examples include the efforts in Brazil and in South Korea.20 Figure 
2.2 illustrates how the steel capacity in the developing world grew rapidly in 
the period. The increase in capacity was especially important during the 1980s 
but began in the 1970s, both as part of import substitution programs as well 
as export promotion  programs  to earn  foreign exchange  after the oil shock 
of  1974. 
The structural change in steel demand is also evident within the internal 
U.S. market. In table 2.2 we see that steel use as a percentage of real GDP rose 
continually until  1974. Subsequently, steel consumption has stabilized  at or 
near 100 million tons per year even while the U.S. economy has continued to 
grow. This reflects both the growth in the service economy, for which steel is 
a negligible input, as well as the growing use of substitute materials such as 
plastics and aluminum. 
20. A complete catalog of  developing country steel practices is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The interested reader should see Howell et al. (1988). 96  Michael 0.  Moore 
The U.S. industry’s responded to the post-1974 crisis with renewed pressure 
for import relief. Steel imports began to rise significantly in 1977, with imports 
rising to an unprecedented  17.8 percent. Japanese and EC exports were most 
prominent in this renewed international pressure. Subsequently, a number of 
U.S. firms began to close plants and others announced large worker layoffs. 
The political allies of the integrated sector organized in response to the eco- 
nomic pressure. Most notably, representatives  from steel-producing commu- 
nities  formed  the  Congressional  Steel  Caucus  to  press  the  steel  industry’s 
case through  legislative action. In  essence, the steel caucus acted as a clear- 
inghouse  for lobbying  efforts by  the  various  fixed factors (labor, producer, 
and  steel-dependent loca!  communities) associated with the integrated steel 
industry. 
Members of  the  steel caucus drew up legislation  calling for strict import 
quotas.  The Carter  administration,  fearing  that  executive  branch  passivity 
would result in a major trade policy fiasco, urged the industry to file dumping 
cases under the revised AD rules in the 1974 Trade Act rather than push for a 
legislated quota (Crandall 1981). The industry followed this advice. 
There was every reason to believe that the cases would end affirmatively 
since the European Community in particular was clearly subsidizing its indus- 
try. The Carter administration therefore worked to fashion a compromise that 
would relieve the political pressure to provide special quotas but would prevent 
final AD duties. The end result was the inauguration of the TPM. This plan 
created a minimum U.S. import price based on the production costs of Japa- 
nese steel firms (widely recognized as the world’s low-cost suppliers) plus a 
“fair” profit margin  of  8 percent. Any steel entering the US. market below 
this minimum price would trigger the self-initiation of an AD petition by the 
administration. In exchange, U.S. firms agreed to withdraw all AD and CVD 
petitions and refrain from filing new cases. 
The integrated sector agreed to the plan for a number of reasons. One partic- 
ularly attractive aspect of the plan for the integrated sector was that the TPM 
applied to all imports. Thus, the TPM discouraged  trade diversion  to other 
sources, un!ike  the 1969 VRA. Second, the industry could avoid further litiga- 
tion costs of pursuing the AP cases. Finally, the plan explicitly provided import 
price  stability. This in turn limited price competition  among domestic rivals 
and helped maintain a cartellike discipline. 
The system provided a number of important benefits to some foreign firms 
as well. All exporters would be in a much better position to judge what was 
“acceptable” price competition  in  the  United  States. This would help them 
avoid AD petitions. In addition, the program also guaranteed high-cost Euro- 
pean firms significant profits in the United States since the TPM created a price 
floor based on the lowest-cost producer. 
Like the 1969 VRA, the TPM is most notable because the industry was able 
to obtain a result outside normal U.S. trade law processes. The steel industry, 
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cedures, secured minimum prices for imported steel and helped domestic firms 
maintain  capacity utilization  and  profit  levels higher  than  under unfettered 
competition. 
2.5  The Quest for Comprehensive Quotas 
2.5.1  Tactical Use of the AD Process:  1982 VRA with the European 
Community 
The TPM created some breathing room for the American integrated sector. 
Overall import market share fell from 21.1 percent in 1978 to 15.5 percent in 
1981 and net operating profits reached $1.6 billion in 1981. 
Nevertheless, the integrated steel sector in the United States began the 1980s 
with major long-term economic problems. In 1981, the U.S. steel sector use of 
outdated OHFs remained at 36.5 percent of its operations. In contrast, Japanese 
and EC firms used this decades-old process in only 4.1 and 26 percent of their 
plants, respectively. Use of  modem  continuous casting techniques followed 
similar patterns: 20.3 percent in the United States versus 70.7 percent in Japan 
and 44.9 percent  in the European  Community  (International Iron and Steel 
Institute 1991). 
Labor costs were also an important problem for U.S. firms. Average unit 
labor costs for US. steel firms in  1979 were $162.7 per ton, while Japanese 
rates averaged around $49.8 and Thyssen of Germany averaged $1  11.1 per ton 
(World Steel Dynamics  1990). Labor productivity was also low in the United 
States (217.3  tons per employee) when compared  to Japan  (474.2 tons per 
employee) and South Korea (448.7 tons per employee). 
Contributing factors to the high labor costs included outdated physical capi- 
tal, rigid work rules, and wages that had risen under the Experimental Negoti- 
ating Agreement of 1974. This labor arrangement guaranteed a 3 percent nomi- 
nal  increase  in  pay  plus  a  full cost-of-living  adjustment  in  return  for an 
agreement not to strike. As table 2.5 shows, steel sector nominal labor compen- 
sation in 1980  was $17.5 per hour, or nearly double the average manufacturing 
compensation of  $9.9 per hour. Ironically, this labor arrangement, which was 
an important contributor to decreased international competitiveness through 
high labor costs, was instituted as a means to cope with import competition. 
Specifically, steel producers believed that the threat of strikes in the late 1960s 
and early  1970s had caused steel-using industries to sign contracts with im- 
porters to protect  themselves  from supply disruptions. The industry conse- 
quently felt that a labor contract that prevented strikes would limit imports and 
thus was worth the added labor costs (Williams  1978). 
The industry was therefore ill equipped to cope with a major downturn and 
a renewal of intense international competition. The onset of the deep recession 
in 1981-82  was thus nearly catastrophic for the U.S. industry. Table 2.6 shows 
that total steel sector capacity utilization fell from 78 percent in  1981 to 48 98  Michael 0.  Moore 
Table 2.5  Production Worker Compensation 
All Steel Firms  All Manufacturing 
Nominal  Real  Productivity  Nominal  Real  Productivity 
Year  Compensation’  Compensationb  Index‘  Compensation’  Compensationb  Index‘ 
1980  17.5 
1981  19.0 
1982  22.7 
1983  21.1 
1984  20.3 
I985  21.4 
1986  22.0 
1987  22.6 
1988  23.6 
1989  23.5 
























































Source: USITC, ‘Annual Survey Concerning Competitive Conditions in  the Steel Industry and Industry 
Efforts to Adjust and Modernize” (Washington, D.C., various years). 
aCompensation figures (given in dollars per hour) include both direct and indirect payments. 
bReal compensation based on CPI-U (1982-84  = 100). 
‘Productivity index given as output per hour. 
percent in 1982.*’  Even as sales and capacity utilization dropped, average costs 
rose so that operating profits for all steel firms fell to a loss of $3.4 billion in 
1982. As table 2.2 shows, total steel sector employment dropped sharply from 
391,000 in 1981 to 289,000 in 1982, or nearly 25 percent. Import market share 
rose from 19.8  percent of the market in 1981 to 21.8 percent in 1982, thereby 
exceeding 20 percent of  the U.S.  market for the first time in the twentieth 
century However, it is important to note that this overall increase in import share 
reflected mainly a precipitous drop in domestic consumption since the absolute 
level of all importsfell from 18.9 to 16.6 million tons in the same period. 
Despite  the overall drop in  volume, imports  of  European  steel  into the 
United States did increase substantially. For example, the volume of US.  im- 
ports of EC hot-rolled carbon steel plate, hot-rolled sheet and strip, and cold- 
rolled sheet and strip rose 20, 25, and 41 percent, respectively from  1980 to 
1981 (USITC 1982). The rise in European exports reflected the fact that Eu- 
rope was also in the midst of a severe recession and, unlike the United States, 
had continued to add steel capacity through the late  1970s. European  firms 
tried to maintain high capacity utilization to keep costs down. Since the Davig- 
non Plan effectively limited intra-Europe sales, many firms aggressively ex- 
ported to the United States. 
The integrated industry therefore pointed to Europe, and especially the ef- 
21. Capacity utilization in Japan and the European Community fell less sharply to 62 and 57 
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Table 2.6  Profit Rates and Capacity Utilization 
Entire Steel Sector  Integrated Sector  Minimill Sector  All Manufacturing 
Protit  Capacity  Protit  Capacity  Profit  Capacity  Profit  Capacity 
Year  Rate”  Utilization  Ratea  Utilization  Ratea  Utilization  Ratea  Utilization 
1980  1.8  73  n.a.h  87  n.a.h  90  7.6  80 
1981  3.8  78  n.a.  79  n.a.  78  7.4  79 
1982  -12.0  48  ma.  48  n.a.  50  5.3  73 
1983  -9.1  56  n.a.  56  n.a.  57  6.3  75 
1984  -0.6  68  n.a.  69  n.a.  67  7.1  80 
1985‘  -1.7  66  -2.9  68  3.1  64  5.9  80 
1986  0.2  64  -1.2  64  5.1  65  5.8  19 
1987  5.3  80  4.5  84  7.9  74  7.3  81 
1988  8.7  89  8.1  96  9.6  19  8.3  84 
1989  7.1  85  6.5  90  7.5  76  6.9  84 
1990  4.8  85  2.9  88  7.1  80  5.7  82 
1991  -0.3“  74  -4.6  78  4.2  68  3.6  78 
Sources: For steel industry data, USITC, “Annual Survey Concerning Competitive Conditions in 
the Steel Industry and Industry Efforts to Adjust and Modernize”  (Washington, D.C., various 
years); for integrated and minimill capacity utilization, WEFA Group, “Steel Market Outlook, 4th 
Quarter  1992” (Philadelphia, 1993); for manufacturing sector data, Council of Economic Advi- 
sors, Economic Indicators (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, various issues). 
doperating profits divided by  net sales. 
hDissaggregated series for minimill and integrated sectors unavailable prior to 1985. 
‘For  1985 onward, steel industry profits are the average for the last  SIX months of  the current 
year and  first six months of  the next. This was the reporting method for the ITC annual steel 
reports (1991-92). 
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fects of government subsidies, as the main source of its difficulties. They also 
argued that the TPM was failing to protect the industry from the effects of 
these foreign subsidies. The combination of  these three factors induced US. 
producers to force the end of the TPM. On January 11, 1982, Bethlehem Steel, 
U.S. Steel, Republic Steel, Inland Steel, Jones and Laughlin Steel, National 
Steel, and Cyclops Steel filed 61 CVD and 33 AD duty petitions against eight 
countries of the European Community, as well as Brazil and Romania. 
The cases’ sheer complexity nearly brought the administrative process to a 
halt  as the responsible  agencies struggled under the statutory  deadlines re- 
cently introduced in the  1979 trade act. Indeed, many observers thought that 
the industry’s strategy was to overload the AP system and force a negotiated 
quota. 
The cases reached their first important juncture when the ITC ruled affirma- 
tively in 20  of the CVD cases and  18 of the AD petitions. However, these 
numbers understate the rulings’  overall impact since a significant number of 
the petitions were lost in the CVD process but won as AD cases. The varied 
outcomes also had important subtle impact. For example, the ITC determined 100  Michael 0.  Moore 
that imports of hot-rolled plate from France, Italy, and Luxembourg  had not 
caused material  injury  but  ruled  affirmatively  on plate  from Belgium,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  West  Germany.  The petitioners  alleged  that  these 
“guilty” exporters dumped steel by margins of 6.8, 100, and 78.9 percent, re- 
spectively. The widely varying allegations reflected in part the variable treat- 
ment afforded different European firms by their respective governments. The 
potential  variation  among different  countries’  plate exports meant  that  EC 
plate exports might have received radically different treatment when entering 
into the United States, ranging from no extra duties on French plate exports to 
100 percent duties on U.K. exports. 
Most observers believed that the DOC was highly likely to make affirmative 
final decisions on dumping and subsidies. The rapid increase in EC exports, 
huge domestic financial losses, and massive steelworker layoffs also made an 
affirmative ITC material injury decision quite probable. This likelihood of af- 
firmative  decisions  meant that  highly  divergent  duties on EC exports  were 
forthcoming. This created an extraordinarily favorable negotiating position for 
the domestic industry. A closed U.S. market for a subset of European exporters 
combined with a barrier-free EC market would have meant massive trade diver- 
sion within Europe. Thus, the Europeans faced the real possibility that their 
steel industry would be thrown into the same chaos that they had so narrowly 
avoided in 1977 and in  1980 (Tsoukalis and Schwartz 1985). The Europeans 
had every reason to negotiate with the United States. 
The Reagan administration also wanted to avoid the open-ended and prohib- 
itive duties on many European steel exports if the ITC voted affirmatively at 
the final AP stage. If AD and CVD duties were imposed, the president would 
lose discretion in steel policy with the European Community, one of the United 
States’ major political and military allies. Complicating matters was a concur- 
rent dispute with the European Community over a natural gas pipeline from 
the Soviet Union to Western Europe. Reagan administration officials believed 
that punitive duties on steel exports would make talks over this issue even more 
problematic and impede cooperation on what the administration saw as a criti- 
cal security policy issue. These factors induced the administration to enter ne- 
gotiations with the European Community for a new VRA. 
The agreement, finally reached in October 1982, limited EC exports to 5.5 
percent of the U.S. market. In return, the U.S. firms dropped their unfair trade 
petitions and agreed to refrain from filing new cases until the agreement ex- 
pired in January  1986. The agreement provided benefits that they had origi- 
nally expected from the TPM. In particular, the VRA both allowed US.  firms 
to avoid further AP litigation costs and provided protection against all EC im- 
ports rather than only a subgroup, thereby avoiding supply diversion. The in- 
dustry’s  disappointment  with  the  details of  the  TPM  administration  were 
solved by  the reliance on numerical targets rather than on a bureaucratically 
administered price-based system. 
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than using other options such as the escape clause is quite clear. First, there 
was no question that some European firms had been subsidized by their gov- 
ernments.  Consequently, affirmative dumping and subsidy  decisions  by  the 
DOC were highly probable. This in turn provided the steel sector with enor- 
mous  leverage since the  dumping and  subsidy  margins  would  vary  widely 
among the EC nations. The possibility of highly divergent, and perhaps perma- 
nent, AD and CVD duties that varied across countries exploited EC fears about 
a renewed steel industry collapse within Europe. Second, the lower injury stan- 
dard under AD and CVD rules meant  that  the probability  of  an affirmative 
decision at the ITC was higher than with an escape clause serious injury deter- 
mination.  This was of  major concern  to  the industry,  given  the ITC’s  1980 
negative  decision  on an  automobile escape clause case.  Finally,  the highly 
technical and nonpolitical nature of these cases and the lack of a presidential 
role in AD and CVD processes created a credible threat to secure high duties. 
This was particularly important since the industry doubted whether President 
Reagan would impose significant tariffs under the escape clause process. 
2.5.2  Comprehensive Quotas at Long Last: 1984 
Despite the VRA victory, the respite for the integrated industry was short 
lived. The noncomprehensive  nature of the agreement led quickly to supply 
diversion, so that other imports rapidly filled the void created by the fall in EC 
exports. Imports from all sources rose slightly from 16.6 million tons in 1982 
to 17.1 million in 1983. 
The domestic firms’ position was weakened not only by  supply diversion. 
As figure 2.3 shows, the steel sector was strongly affected by the start of the 
dollar’s spectacular rise in value. This reduced sharply the landed price of for- 
eign steel into the United States and helped cause import volume to rise by 
almost 52  percent from 1983 to 1984. 
Integrated firms, severely disappointed by an import share still exceeding 20 
percent despite the VRA, began once again to prepare trade cases. Two efforts 
were initiated. One, spearheaded by U.S. Steel, resulted in dozens of new AD 
and CVD cases involving non-EC countries. The second strategy was initiated 
in January  1984 when Bethlehem Steel and the USW filed an escape clause 
petition on behalf of the entire carbon (and alloy) steel industry. Both efforts 
seemed to have a negotiated  global VRA as an objective, but the tactics to 
reach that goal were quite different. 
U.S. Steel and its allies wanted to pursue a strategy similar to the one uti- 
lized against European imports in 1982.  They believed that the case for unfair 
foreign practices was so clear that very high and potentially open-ended duties 
could be placed on foreign exporters. In addition, many of the exporting na- 
tions named in the new round of petitions were developing countries in which 
steel sector government intervention was even more extensive than in Europe. 
A further advantage of the AD and CVD processes from the steel industry’s 
perspective was the continued exclusion of President Reagan from any role. 102  Michael 0.  Moore 
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Fig. 2.3  Steel import market share and trade-weighted exchange rate 
Sources: AISI (various issues); Federal Reserve Board. 
Bethlehem and the USW, on the other hand, had come to believe that unfair 
trade  remedies,  used  or threatened  by  the  industry  for over  10 years, had 
yielded at best only partial protection. Consequently, this alliance of an inte- 
grated firm and steelworker union opted to push finally for a comprehensive 
import barrier program, but one that might last for only five years under the 
escape clause mechanism. 
The first important hurdle in the escape clause case was to win an affirmative 
decision at the ITC. The two most critical issues at the ITC was the definition 
of  the “domestic industry” and whether imports were a substantial cause of 
serious injury. If the ITC’s ruling was affirmative, the decision would then be 
on President Reagan’s desk in September 1984, less than two months before 
the presidential election. 
Even as the ITC considered this escape clause petition, the integrated firms, 
the  USW,  and  their  congressional  allies proposed  legislation  imposing  an 
across-the-board 15 percent quota on imported steel, an import share last seen 
in 1976. A revised bill also included a provision requiring the industry to rein- 
vest all net cash flow from steel operations back into the steel industry. This 
was a direct concession to the USW since union leaders feared that protection- 
induced profits would be used to diversify out of steel as U.S. Steel had with 
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The title of the quota bill, The Fair Trade in Steel Act of 1984, attests to the 
importance of trying to reach the rhetorical high ground. The focus, proponents 
of H.R. 5081 insisted, was not protection but redress of legitimate grievances 
against foreigners. For example, Representative John Murtha (D-Pa.) said that 
there may be room for argument about “academic assertions” that the industry 
had  offered  overgenerous  labor  contracts  and  had  modernized  slowly  but 
“there is absolutely no room for argument regarding the predatory pricing and 
trade practices being implemented by foreign steel producers in their zeal to 
acquire the  commanding  share of  the  domestic  steel  market  in the  world’s 
largest free market-the  United States” (U.S. Congress, House 1984, 7). 
Congressional  skeptics of  the  legislative  effort insisted  that  the industry 
should use the extant trade remedy apparatus rather than obtain a special quota. 
Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.) also noted that factors other than unfair foreign compe- 
tition were at the heart of the integrated sector’s problems: “Imports of steel 
for 1974 were about 16  million tons and imports in 1983 were still only about 
17 million tons. . . .  What has happened is that, one, the domestic steel market 
has  shrunk as less steel is being used and, two, minimills have entered the 
market” (US. Congress, House 1984, 51). 
Representatives of the steelworkers, steel producers, and steel-based com- 
munities were highly visible in the legislative hearings. Not surprisingly, all 
argued strongly in favor of the quota bill. Much of the focus was on foreign 
subsidies, global overcapacity, and the wrenching effects on steel communities 
as the industry restructured.22 
Opposition to the bill came mainly from administration representatives  (in- 
cluding Commerce Secretary Malcom Baldrige and Special Trade Representa- 
tive William Brock), academic opponents, and a number of representatives of 
steel  importers.  Some important  industrial  consumers  of  steel  did  testify 
against the quota bill, including officials from Caterpillar, Inc. However, do- 
mestic steel-using industries apparently were prepared to do little more than 
offer token testimony in opposition; according to both steel-user and steel in- 
dustry representatives,  extensive outside lobbying activity by  users  was ex- 
tremely  limited.  In private  conversations,  a user-industry  representative  ac- 
knowledged that the massive steel sector employment losses, combined with 
the foreign subsidies, created little room for effective opposition to steel pro- 
tection. 
Perhaps the most fascinating congressional testimony offered in opposition 
to the import restrictions came from Kenneth Iverson, CEO of Nucor Corpora- 
tion, the most successful minimill firm  in  the United States.23  Iverson spoke 
22. See, e.g., testimony by John Sheehan of the USW, David Roderick of U.S.  Steel, and Mayor 
Richard Caliguiri of Pittsburgh, a leader of Local Officials for Fair Trade (US.  Congress, House 
1984). 
23. Other minimill firms were more sympathetic to the quota legislation. See, e.g., the testimony 
by James Collins,  president of the Steel Manufacturers  Association (SMA), a minimill trade group 
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out strongly against any trade protection and asserted that “we believe that 
tariff or nontariff trade barriers will delay modernization of our steel industry, 
[and] will cost the consumer billions of  dollars.” He argued that the govern- 
ment could instead offer assistance in retraining programs and various special 
tax credits directed specifically at the integrated sector (U.S. Congress, House 
In July, the ITC rendered  its decision on the escape clause petition. The 
commission ruled that only five of the nine constituent steel “industries” were 
eligible for import relief. To relieve the injury, the ITC recommended that the 
president impose a combination of tariffs and quotas on imports for the seri- 
ously  injured  industries  producing  steel  sheet  and  strip,  plate,  structural 
shapes, wire and wire products, and semifinished steel. The protection would 
be phased out over the next five years. The ITC, however, found that the indus- 
tries producing pipe and tube, bar, rod, and rails were injured for other reasons 
more important than import competition. 
The ITCS decision was a mixed outcome for the industry and reflected the 
rising importance of the minimills in the United States. In particular, the com- 
missioners argued that intraindustry competition (i.e., domestic minimills) was 
a more important source of injury than foreign competition for the four product 
categories denied relief. Indeed, the ITC pointed out that minimills had consis- 
tently  undersold  both  imported and integrated mills  and had  still remained 
profitable for the previous three years (USITC 1984,47-54). 
President Reagan once again was faced with a dilemma over steel trade pol- 
icy. The law required the president to accept, reject, or modify the ITC’s recom- 
mendations by September 1984. If he followed the ITC plan and provided pro- 
tection for only the five ITC-approved petitions, the steel industry was likely 
to press forward with the other unfair trade petitions. Accepting the ITC’s es- 
cape clause  suggestions would  also mean  foreigners could retaliate against 
U.S. exports if  compensation was not forthcoming. If  the president rejected 
import relief altogether, the industry still could rely on AD and CVD cases in 
which the president played no role whatsoever. Total rejection of relief might 
also lead to passage of the quota legislation which Reagan would be forced to 
veto right before the election. 
There was intense disagreement among administration advisers about the 
proper action. Some counseled that Reagan should hold fast to his free trade 
principles.  Others, especially political advisers, counseled  that  some action 
was necessary since rejection of all relief would lead to potentially significant 
consequences in the 1984  election^.^^ 
In the end, the Reagan administration formally rejected the ITC recommen- 
dations but announced simultaneously a program to deal with steel imports. 
The heart of the plan, scheduled to expire in 1989, was a comprehensive steel 
1984,288-89). 
24.  See  Niskanen  (1988)  and  Walters  (1988) for  further  discussion  about  these  intra- 
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quota encompassing all of the industries in the section 201 petition, including 
the four products for which the ITC had recommended no relief. The VRA 
would apply to countries “whose exports to the United States had increased 
significantly in the previous years” (49 Federal Register 36813). This would 
include all major suppliers to the United States, including the European Com- 
munity, Brazil, South Korea, Japan, and others. (See table 2.8 for a list of in- 
cluded exporters.) 
The VRA was designed to limit imported finished steel products from the 
covered countries to 18.4 percent of the domestic market (adjusted annually) 
and a specific quota of  1.7 million tons for semifinished steel. A critical new 
aspect of the program was that the administration  agreed to administer the 
quota on a product- and country-specific basis. This would help alleviate prod- 
uct upgrading and supply diversion, both of  which had been major industry 
complaints with the 1969 VRA with the European Community and Japan and 
the 1982 VRA with the European Community. Finally, the program incorpo- 
rated an aspect of the congressional quota bill that required the domestic indus- 
try to reinvest all net cash flow from their  steel operations back into their 
steel plants. 
The  1984 VRA program was a major political  victory for the integrated 
sector. The industry secured its most important long-term trade goal, namely, 
a comprehensive quota covering nearly all products and all exporting coun- 
tries. The industry certainly would have preferred the 15 percent quota embod- 
ied in the legislation, but it did obtain an import share in line with that of the 
late 1970s. The USW also could claim an important triumph since the industry 
was required to reinvest steel sector profits back into steel operations and pro- 
vide some funds for worker retraining. 
The integrated industry was able to win this victory through brilliant use of 
the multiple paths of protection in the United States. The industry simultane- 
ously pursued legislative action, relief under the escape clause, and the imposi- 
tion of AD and CVD duties. The threat of the AD and CVD duties was perhaps 
most significant since they confronted the administration with the reemergence 
of  near-prohibitive  duties  that  could  be  imposed  without  any  executive 
branch input. 
The timing of the lobbying effort also served to maximize political pressure 
on the Reagan administration in an election year. The escape clause petition in 
particular was structured so that the president would have to reach a decision 
only eight weeks before the  If  the  1984 presidential election had 
proved to be a close one, the electoral votes of  major steel-producing states 
such as Pennsylvania and Ohio could have been decisive. 
The program was clearly an unusually protectionist regime. Not only did 
the administration approve a comprehensive protection  scheme for the steel 
25. Representatives from both the USW and a major steel firm  both deny, however, that presi- 
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industry, it did so by negotiating VRAs rather than imposing a tariff under the 
escape clause. Most economists consider such quantitative restrictions clearly 
inferior to the imposition of tariffs since they transfer potential tariff revenue to 
foreign exporters in terms of quota rents.26  Second, the administration offered 
protection far beyond what was required under U.S. trade law since four of the 
products included in the VRA program were ruled ineligible for relief by the 
ITC. The administration also instituted a managed trade program since specific 
numerical targets were included for countries and products. Finally, the man- 
dated  reinvestment  of  net  cash  flow back  into  steel  operations  contrasted 
starkly with the administration’s general predilection to allow markets to deter- 
mine capital allocation. 
Why did the “free market” Reagan administration offer such sweeping and 
broad-based protection? This acquiescence to steel industry and steel union 
demands clearly was not a result of an ideological predisposition for protection 
and intervention. The answer must be that the steel industry had enough politi- 
cal clout to force an outcome acceptable to them.*’ 
Nonetheless, the VRA program provided  distinct political advantages for 
the administration over other possible outcomes. President Reagan could assert 
that, as with the automobile agreement with Japan, he was not imposing tariffs 
but negotiating an agreement. This would allow him to score political points 
with steel sector voters while retaining his free trade rhetoric. A negotiated 
agreement also insured that the administration would retain some control over 
steel trade policy decisions. This was particularly important given the sensitive 
nature of steel issues within the European Community. Such discretion would 
have been impossible if final AD and CVD duties had been imposed. The use 
of a VRA also enabled the administration to control the timing of protection 
offered the steel industry. Unlike AD and CVD measures, which have no pre- 
cise expiration date, the VRA expired in October 1989, fully 11 months after 
the  1988 presidential  election. This would help limit the ability of  the steel 
industry to reinject steel trade policy into presidential politics. 
In summary, the 1984 VRA demonstrated the significant political power of 
the U.S. integrated steel industry.**  Industry producers, union leaders, and con- 
gressional  representatives  of  steel-producing  communities  worked  hand  in 
hand to secure a highly interventionist trade policy outcome from the Reagan 
26.  Moore and Suranovic (1993) have shown that VRAs may  welfare-dominate tariffs when 
GATT-consistent compensatory tariff reductions or retaliation are included. 
27. It is also interesting to note that the copper industry, a less politically powerful industry, also 
won an escape clause case at the ITC at about the same time. President Reagan refused to provide 
protection in this case. 
28. Another example of steel industry clout was the appointment of Eugene Frank to the ITC in 
198  1. Frank was strongly backed for the position by  Pennsylvania Senator John Heinz and had 
long and close ties with the steel industry. Prior to his appointment, he organized regional Commit- 
tees for Fair Trade. Frank’s nomination was strongly opposed by  foreign steel producers who 
asserted that he  was “clearly biased” (WaU Street Juurnal, July  15, 1981). Commissioner Frank 
has had the most protectionist voting record in commission history and voted affirmatively in all 
material injury decisions on which he cast a vote. 107  The Waning Influence of Big Steel? 
administration. They pursued a multifaceted approach that exploited the highly 
cohesive nature of the steel industry coalition, the lack of organized opposition 
by steel-using industries, and the AP procedures available to them. Subsequent 
steel policy outcomes in the  1980s and early  1990s would not be nearly as 
favorable to Big Steel. 
2.5.3 
Economic Performance of  the Steel Industry: 1984-88 
The economic condition of  the U.S.  steel industry improved dramatically 
after the introduction of  the global VRAs in October 1984. Table 2.6 shows 
that capacity utilization for the domestic industry rose from 68 percent in 1984 
to 89 percent in 1988. Operating profits increased from a loss of $186 million 
in 1984 to a gain of over $3.5 billion in 1988. Not only did the steel industry’s 
performance improve relative to its own position in  1984, it also performed 
better relative to the U.S. manufacturing  sector as a whole. Specifically, in 
1988 steel sector capacity utilization and profit rates finally exceeded the over- 
all manufacturing average. This represented a dramatic improvement over the 
disastrous performance of the early 1980s. 
A number of  factors contributed to this improvement in economic perfor- 
mance. The reduction in import competition was one factor. Total imports from 
all sources fell from a historic high of 26.4 percent (26 million tons) in 1984 
to only 20.4 percent (21 million tons) in  1988. However, the VRA program 
was not the sole contributor to the reduced imports. Most important, the U.S. 
industry’s international competitiveness greatly improved, some of which was 
a consequence of  integrated sector restructuring and other purely exogenous 
factors. 
Perhaps the most important source of improvement was the moderation of 
labor costs during this period. The USW, for example, offered concessions 
in labor negotiations totaling $4.5 billion as well as flexibility on work rules 
(Williams 1988).  As table 2.5 shows, these efforts resulted in important gains 
in unit labor costs. Productivity rose by 27.5 percent from 1984 to 1988, while 
real steelworker compensation rose by only 2 percent. In contrast, productivity 
for the entire US.  manufacturing rose about 21 percent, while real compensa- 
tion wages actually fell by  approximately  2 percent. Thus, labor costs cor- 
rected for productivity seemed to moderate in the steel sector, in contrast to 
the steelworkers’ poor productivity growth and guaranteed wage increases in 
the 1970s. 
The integrated producers also continued their intensive rationalization and 
modernization efforts. Rationalization efforts included U.S. Steel’s abandon- 
ment of five integrated plants and National Steel’s sale of  its Weirton, West 
Virginia, plant to its employees in  1984 (Hogan  1987). Technological back- 
wardness vis-8-vis foreign producers lessened as modernization expanded the 
use of continuous casting in the United States from 39.6 percent of production 
The VRA Renewal Campaign: 1989 108  Michael 0.  Moore 
in  1984 to 61.3 percent in  1988. The use of outdated OHFs also fell from 9 
percent to just over 5 percent over the same period. However, the use of BOFs 
remained  essentially  unchanged  over the  period  and  reflected  a continuing 
need for modernization (International Iron and Steel Institute 199  1). 
Perhaps the most important exogenous factors were the substantial weaken- 
ing of the dollar after 1985 and strong worldwide economic growth. Figure 2.3 
shows that after the dollar’s depreciation in 1985, steel import market share fell 
substantially in the United States. Steel consumption patterns also contributed 
to a reduction of exports to the United  States. In particular, while U.S. con- 
sumption remained essentially unchanged from 1984 to  1988, steel demand 
rose by 37 percent in the European Community, 16.2 percent in Japan, and 20 
percent in the developing world (International Iron and Steel Institute 1991). 
Thus, exchange rate changes and strong price pressures abroad both created 
powerful incentives for foreign steel firms to exploit non-U.S. markets. 
Another critical aspect of  the improved overall economic statistics of the 
U.S.  steel industry was the continued strong performance  of  domestic min- 
imills. As table 2.6 indicates, minimills’  capacity utilization and profits were 
consistently higher than the integrated sector. Since the market share of  min- 
imills was growing throughout the 1980s, the minimills’ economic experience 
helped bring  up the  average performance  of  the  sector. Persisting minimill 
pressure also contributed to continuing competitive pressures on the integrated 
mills, even if import pressures had subsided somewhat. 
All  of  these  indicators  of  improved  economic  performance  became  im- 
portant factors as decisions about renewal of the VRA program approached 
in 1988. 
Steel Policy and Presidential Politics in 1988: Dkjh Vu All Over Again 
One of  the  supposed  key  political  advantages to  the  VRA  program  an- 
nounced in  1984 was that it would extend beyond the next presidential cam- 
paign  into  1989. This, the Reagan administration hoped,  would prevent the 
steel industry from using the presidential election to affect steel trade policy. 
Indeed, as the presidential  campaign wore on, it appeared that steel import 
policy  would play only a minor role in the election. Governor Michael Du- 
kakis, the Democratic party nominee, did come out in favor of a VRA renewal 
but never made it an important part of his election campaign. 
However, in the late summer and early fall, Republican presidential candi- 
date George Bush was significantly behind in the polls. As part of the general 
effort to coordinate a come-from-behind victory and to help solidify political 
support among blue-collar  workers in  the  steel region, the Bush campaign 
agreed to support a VRA extension. Industry and campaign representatives 
negotiated for some time in the early fall to have Bush appear at a steel facility 
where he would announce support for an extension. Though this appearance 
never  materialized, the  Republican  campaign  arranged  instead for the  vice 
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to Senator John Heinz,  a Republican from Pennsylvania  and an ardent sup- 
porter of the steel industry in particular and of  aggressive U.S. trade policy 
in general. 
In the letter dated November 4, 1988, Bush stated that “one of the significant 
successes of  the Reagan Administration  has been the President’s  Steel Pro- 
gram. . . .  A comprehensive VRA program has proven to be more effective in 
offsetting unfair trade practices than trying to counter these practices on a case- 
by-case basis. . . . One of the key trade policy goals of a Bush Administration 
will  be to achieve an international  consensus on eliminating  [dumping and 
subsidizing of  steel], and, pending that, I can assure you of my intention to 
continue the voluntary restraint program after September 30, 1989.” The vice- 
president, however, did not outline any specifics about the timing and details 
of his proposed program. 
This letter, written just as George Bush was about to win an overwhelming 
election victory, reflected the steel industry’s continued image as a powerful 
political  presence.  However,  the industry’s  inability  to  nail  down  specific 
promises about the nature of the VRA extension was to haunt it later in 1989. 
Soon after inauguration, posturing began over the extension’s exact details. 
In previous public discussions, integrated steel producers and their allies domi- 
nated  the field. In  essence, these early  steel trade arguments  revolved  only 
around the benefits of steel protection and the presence of foreign government 
intervention. Little regard for the effects on domestic steel consumers was evi- 
dent in decisions. This was to change in a profound way during this period. 
Most important, steel-user interests were to play a much more prominent role 
in the public discussions and in the final outline of the policies. 
Big Steel versus CASUM 
One of the first public indications of the increased importance of the VRA’s 
user effects appeared in February  1989. The House Ways and Means Trade 
Subcommittee requested that the ITC conduct an investigation into the costs 
of the VRAs to steel-using industries. The ITC was instructed to consider the 
VRA’s effects on the exports, imports, and prices of  steel-using industries and 
to poll these industries concerning their positions on the VRA’s renewal. 
In the report, the commission estimated  that the VRAs had increased the 
weighted average of domestic and imported steel prices by 0.6 percent in 1985 
and 1.6 percent in 1986. The estimates of price increase rose to 1.4 percent in 
1987 and fell to 0.2 percent in 1988. The commission also calculated that the 
steel restraints reduced U.S.  exports of steel-using industries by over $1.7 bil- 
lion dollars in 1985-88.  The ITC study also noted that strong demand for cer- 
tain types of steel and the weakened dollar were important causes of separate 
upward pressure on prices (USITC 1989b). 
This report is a highly unusual document. The views and interests of protec- 
tion seekers are totally absent since the report was commissioned as a purely 
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focus, therefore, was on the costs rather than the benefits of protection. The 
commissioning of this report, however, was only a hint of how user interests 
were to play a near-dominating role in the 1989 VRA extension debate. 
As  1989 wore on, the usual array of  actors lined up in favor of  the VRA 
extension (see table 2.7). Steel-producing  community representatives  in the 
bipartisan Congressional Steel Caucus, the integrated firms’ trade association 
(AISI), and the steelworkers’ union (USW) reassembled the coalition that had 
been so successful five years earlier. The SMA, the minimill trade association, 
also strongly supported the extension in congressional testimony, but the major 
players continued to be members of the integrated steel sector. The main goals 
of the steel industry and its allies were to push for a five-year extension of the 
existing program, but with the inclusion of  nonparticipating nations (Canada 
and Sweden) into the extended VRA. 
The proponents of  a continuation and enlargement of the program argued 
that  the  improved  economic  performance  of  the  industry  noted  above was 
“proof” that the VRA had been the most successful steel trade policy program 
in U.S. history. The industry, they argued, was now competitive but still needed 
five more years to complete the modernization program. Without  a full five- 
year extension, modernization plans might be disrupted. Allegheny-Ludlum, 
for example, asserted that a $5 billion dollar expansion would be abandoned 
if the VRA were not extended. They also used the results of ITC steel-user 
Table 2.7  Policy Positions and Economic Stakes on 1989 VRA Extension 
Economic  Policy Position 
Consequences 
of VRA 
Extension  Support  Neutral  Oppose 
Benefited  AISI (association of 
integrated producers) 
USW (steelworker union) 
SMA (association of 
minimill producers) 
Unaffected  Congressional Steel Caucus 
(Congress members from 
steel-producing districts 
and states) 
Coalition for a Competitive 
America: Steel Users for 
VRAs (steel-user group 
organized by AISI) 
Chrysler Corp. (steel-using 
automobile producer) 
Hurt 
Nucor Corp. (minimill producer) 
General Motors  CASUM (steel-user group) 
Ford Motor Co.  Caterpillar, Inc. (heavy 
equipment manufacturer and 
exporter) 
PMA (small businesses 
processing steel for 
intermediate input use) 
Sources; Policy position based on testimony before Congress (U.S. Congress, House 1989). Posi- 
tions of other individual steel-user industries can be found in USITC (1989b). 111  The Waning Influence of Big Steel? 
investigation to argue that price increases due to the VRAs had been small, 
especially compared to the effects of the depreciating dollar. The industry also 
asserted that VRAs were the only “viable trade policy in view of the continuing 
lack of access to foreign markets, unfair trading practices of foreign countries 
and structural world overcapacity in steelmaking” (AISI 1989, 1). The industry 
also argued that if the VRA were not extended, they would be forced to rely 
on AD and CVD petitions. In appearance after appearance, the industry raised 
the specter that these unfair trade remedies would be even more disruptive than 
a VRA since the margins would be very high and vary greatly across countries 
and products (AISI 1989, 17). 
While these arguments may have had a familiar ring, the actions of  steel- 
user groups in this period were radically different from earlier steel trade de- 
bates. Most important,  a lobbying coalition  of  users successfully overcame 
transaction and organizational costs to mount a campaign against the renewal. 
This ad hoc lobbying organization, CASUM, was headed by Caterpillar, Inc., 
a manufacturer of  earth-moving equipment and a major U.S. steel-using ex- 
porter, and the Precision Metalforming Association (PMA), a trade association 
of small businesses that process raw  steel for industrial manufacturers, espe- 
cially for the automobile industry. 
CASUM’s position was that the president should terminate the VRA pro- 
gram. Their highly public campaign focused on four major points. The first 
was  that  steel-using  firms  provided  much  more  employment  than  steel- 
producing firms. Furthermore, they argued that the VRAs harmed U.S. export 
competitiveness of manufactured goods since they were important steel users. 
Foreign competitors, CASUM insisted, had access to lower world prices of 
steel and consequently could charge lower prices than U.S. exporters. 
The second argument was that the steel quotas had increased prices and led 
to spot shortages, especially for firms using modern inventory management 
techniques (“just in time” delivery). The spot shortages were exacerbated by 
the “short supply” provisions under which quotas were supposed to be relaxed 
if a domestic firm could show that a particular steel product was unavailable 
domestically. In addition, the steel user bore the burden of  proof in showing 
that such conditions existed. Other complaints by  CASUM included a provi- 
sion that limited the amount of short-supply steel that could be granted a spe- 
cific country and a nontransparent application process that could take many 
weeks. 
Third, CASUM argued that the steel industry should rely, like virtually all 
other domestic industries, on the established AP procedures to address its trade 
complaints, If unfair competition was occumng, then AD and CVD petitions 
should be adjudicated to their final conclusions. 
Finally, CASUM pointed to the high profits in 1988 and improving domestic 
steel industry competitiveness as evidence that the domestic industry did not 
deserve special help. 
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of foreign firms and governments and away from an argument about free trade 
versus protection. Instead, CASUM tried to direct the discussion toward the 
VRA’s effects on U.S. manufacturing interests, especially exporters and small 
businesses. This was a highly effective tactic since both have broad political 
support. CASUM also appealed indirectly to protectionist elements in Con- 
gress by emphasizing that VRAs rewarded unfair traders through the transfer 
of quota rents.  In conjunction with this  strategy  of  stressing  how the VRA 
hurt U.S. domestic manufacturing interests, CASUM steadfastly refused any 
cooperation from foreign steel companies and U.S. steel importers, the tradi- 
tional major opponents of steel import barriers. The coalition also made a con- 
certed effort to identify steel-using firms in the districts of Congress members 
who had supported the steel industry in the past. This helped provide constit- 
uent counterbalance to the votes of the steel-producing industry. 
CASUM’s efforts caught the pro-VRA coalition almost totally off guard. In 
response, steel industry lobbyists hurriedly  organized a user-industry group 
(named Coalition for a Competitive America: Steel Users for VRAs) as a coun- 
terweight to CASUM. The most prominent large steel user in this group was 
Chrysler Corporation, an automobile company and a major steel user. This 
position reflects the trade activist philosophy of Lee Iaccoca, a frequent critic 
of liberal U.S. trade policy. However, although Chrysler did lend its name to 
the effort, its public participation was limited. For example, Chrysler represen- 
tatives did not appear before congressional committees in favor of  the VRA 
extension. 
Another indication of integrated steel firms’ concerns about CASUM was 
an AISI-published refutation (VRAs  and the Steel Consumer)  of an earlier Cat- 
erpillar position paper on the effects of the VRA. The AISI strongly rejected 
Caterpillar’s claims that the VRAs had hurt U.S. export competitiveness or that 
the steel industry had gained sufficient strength to prosper without special re- 
lief. The USW also argued forcefully against CASUM, both in press releases 
and in testimony before Congress. 
The most important aspect of the fight between CASUM and VRA support- 
ers was that Big Steel was forced to enter into a domestic debate with other 
U.S. industries about the domestic costs of the program. This radically changed 
the nature of the debate since it removed the discussion from simply making a 
case about unfair foreign practices and the social costs of  massive steel em- 
ployee layoffs. In addition, the fact that a major U.S. exporting firm (Caterpil- 
lar) was complaining of the VRA’s effects helped sway opinions among politi- 
cians who view imports as “bad” because they destroy jobs and view exports 
as “good” because they create jobs. 
The VRA  Extension and Its Aftermath 
In the final analysis, the VRA was continued as candidate George Bush had 
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granted a two-and-a-half year extension but at the same time set a final and 
permanent expiration date. After the expiration date, the steel industry would 
be required to rely on normal trade remedy procedures for any import restric- 
tions. The administration also promised to begin multilateral steel trade negoti- 
ations aimed at eliminating the underlying reasons for trade frictions, most 
importantly foreign subsidies and worldwide steel overcapacity. 
The program was a far cry from that requested by the integrated industry. 
Perhaps the most disappointing provision was the two-and-a-half rather than 
five-year extension. The Bush administration also allowed for a 1 percent in- 
creuse per year in the quota for countries willing to begin eliminating trade- 
distorting steel sector practices. The short-supply provisions for products un- 
available in the United States, a major sore point for CASUM members, were 
also substantially liberalized. The program instituted a fast-track 15-day proce- 
dure for obtaining steel under short supply when the product was either not 
produced domestically or when domestic capacity utilization for that product 
exceeded 90 percent. In addition, the burden of proof in this application pro- 
cess shifted to domestic steel producers,  away from steel consumers. These 
changes reduced the ability of domestic steel suppliers to raise prices in the 
face of tight supplies on subcategories of steel. Finally, President Bush added 
no new countries to the VRA program as requested by the steel industry. 
In short, the 1989 VRA extension was a major disappointment for the inte- 
grated industry and a major victory for the steel-using industries. This is evi- 
dent from the press reports at the time. The Fur Eastern  Economic Review 
(August 10, 1989), for example, observed that the outcome “is a demonstration 
of the new lobbying power of the steel users, especially Caterpillar.” Iron Age 
(September 1989, 62), the most important steel trade magazine in the United 
States, reported that Milton Deaner, president of the AISI, viewed the Bush 
plan as naive and left the industry too vulnerable to unfair trade practices. The 
magazine also noted that Caterpillar was elated by its prospects under that the 
new VRA. 
If the VRA extension was so disappointing to the integrated sector, why did 
the steel firms and USW not reject the VRA extension and pursue AD and 
CVD cases as they had in previous years? Most important, the industry would 
have had a difficult time winning an AD or CVD petition. Even if the industry 
could have showed that dumping and subsidization were taking place, proving 
material injury would have been highly uncertain given the industry’s healthy 
financial position. Thus, a less-than-ideal VRA was more appealing than un- 
dertaking  the major expense of  a massive and likely unsuccessful AD and 
CVD campaign. 
The disappointing results of  the  1989 extension may have been an unex- 
pected consequence of  the  industry’s acceptance  of  VRAs in  1984. In  the 
purely technical AP process, DOC and ITC administrators  cannot consider 
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tive material injury decisions in 1982 and 1984 and received definitive duties. 
Instead, steel producers agreed to the VRAs in order to obtain comprehensive 
protection. As it turned out, the ultimate problem with this strategy was that it 
allowed the user groups to reenter the policy debate when the VRAs were up 
for renewal. This was complicated by the fact that the industry’s fragmentation 
and improved economic performance undercut its political position in favor of 
import protection. 
It is, however, unclear exactly why the Bush administration proposed a steel 
program so unfavorable to the steel industry. It is possible that the greatly im- 
proved economic performance of the industry in 1988 convinced the adminis- 
tration that a highly restrictive VRA was unnecessary. It is also possible that 
the lobbying campaign by CASUM, nearly unprecedented in U.S. trade policy 
history, swayed opinions in the White House and on Capitol Hill. CASUM’s 
campaign more likely simply provided political cover for the administration to 
follow its free trade instincts. In any case, the administration was sufficiently 
unafraid of the political clout of the integrated steel sector to propose and im- 
plement a trade policy highly unsatisfactory to Big Steel. 
An intriguing aspect of the  1989 VRA extension was the timing of its final 
expiration. President Bush’s two-and-a-half year extension meant that the pro- 
gram would expire about eight months before the 1992 presidential election. 
Some participants recall that this date was simply “splitting the difference” 
between the five years requested by the industry and an immediate termination. 
Regardless of the motivation, this timetable meant that the integrated steel sec- 
tor would have a chance to use its leverage in a presidential campaign in 1992 
just as it had in 1984. 
The actual experience of the VRA in the post-1989 period strongly suggests 
that, not only was the program less than what the integrated firms wanted, the 
quotas may have had very little effect at all on the domestic steel market. In 
particular, the quotas were not filled on a country or product basis for most of 
the post- 1987 period. 
Table 2.8 shows that the quotas were binding or nearly binding for most of 
the first two years. However, beginning in 1988, the overall quota fill rate fell 
from 79 percent to a low of 54 percent in the last three months of the VRA in 
1992. In addition, subsequent to the extension in October  1989, no country 
filled its  overall quota,  and  in  only  one  instance  (Finland in  the  October- 
December 1990 period) did imports reach over 90 percent of the quota limits. 
This pattern is also repeated for individual product categories. Table 2.9 shows 
that after 1988, the quotas were binding or near binding only in some specialty 
products-alloy  tool steel, tin plate, and stainless steel plate and sheet. 
The nonbinding quotas suggest that the integrated industry achieved very 
little in the way  of protection in the 1989 VRA extension. The industry  may 
have enjoyed some benefits through an upper bound on foreign competition; 
this may have helped investor confidence in integrated firms and eased some 115  The Waning Influence of Big Steel? 
Table 2.8  Percentage of VRA Filled (by country) 

















































































































































Sources; USITC (various issues); U.S. Department of  Commerce, Office of  Agreements Com- 
pliance. 
aIncludes Spain and Portugal, both of which were not part of the original VRA agreement. 
financing efforts, but it is highly unlikely that the industry effectively limited 
import competition during this period.29 
The domestic industry continued to evolve after the VRA  extension. In par- 
ticular, minimills recommenced their strong surge forward vis-A-vis domestic 
integrated firms and imports. A  measure of strong minimill international com- 
petitiveness is that quotas on traditional minimill long products were filled at 
an even lower rate than other VRA  categories. Table 2.9 shows that in the final 
period of  the VRA,  imports of bars, wire products, and structurals reached 
only 38, 68, and 23 percent of allowable imports, respectively. But perhaps 
the strongest indicator of future minimill strength was the already-mentioned 
inauguration by Nucor of its Crawfordsville sheet mill, which began produc- 
tion  of  flat-rolled products using  horizontal  thin-slab casting  techniques  in 
1989. 
The other major aspect of the Bush administration’s steel policy was the 
multilateral steel negotiations, conducted parallel to the VRA  program. The 
Bush administration hoped that a MSA  would eliminate the underlying prob- 
lems that had bedeviled steel trade for 20 years, especially global overcapacity, 
29. However, Helpman and Kmgman (1989) have argued that there is a theoretical possibility 
that nonbinding quotas can lead to price increases in an imperfectly competitive market. 116  Michael 0.  Moore 
Table 2.9  Percentage of VRA Filled (by product) 
Product 
~~  ~~  ~~ 
1986  1987  1988  1/89-9/89  10/89-12/90”  1/91-3/92b 
Flat-rolled  107 
Plate  105 
Semi  finished  95 
Alloy tool steel  105 
Stainless bar and rod  87 
Other stainless and specialty products  82 
Oil country tubular goods  86 
95 
Bars  82 
Structurals  92 
Other steel products  72 
Flat-rolled (disaggregated) 
Other pipe and tubes  111 
Wire rod and wire products 
Hot-rolled sheet and strip  104 
Cold-rolled sheet and strip  101 
Blackplate  102 
Electrical sheet and strip  113 
Stainless plate  98 
Stainless sheet and strip  98 
Tin plate  107 
Tin-free steel  1  04 
Electrogalvanized  102 
95  81 
100  89 
100  87 
91  96 
89  92 
94  81 
86  70 
99  86 
87  81 
79  79 
92  88 
78  62 
96  82 
93  77 
112  93 
96  97 
93  86 
94  93 
96  96 
96  93 
































































Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Import Compliance. 
Note: Product-level data prior to 1986 is no longer available from DOC. 
’Excludes Australia, Brazil, China,  Finland, Mexico, Trinidad, and Venezuela. DOC data is  no 
longer available. 
’Excludes Trinidad and Tobago. DOC data is no longer available. 
tariff and nontariff barriers, and trade-distorting practices such as dumping and 
subsidies. The entire industry, including the USW, the AISI,  and the  SMA, 
strongly supported this effort. Indeed, a multilateral solution to steel problems 
had long been the principal long-term public policy goal of all members of the 
domestic steel industry. 
The major stumbling blocks of the MSA centered on familiar issues-for- 
eign steel subsidies and U.S. AD and CVD procedures. The U.S. integrated 
industry’s position was known as “MSA plus.” The industry wanted an outright 
ban on all subsidies to steel firms, including those for research and develop- 
ment, environmental technologies, and regional development subsidies. The 
industry also insisted that any agreement not affect US.  steel firms’ or the 
USW’s access to AD and CVD procedures. 
As the April 1992 demise of the VRA program approached, the interested 
actors in the steel industry developed positions about what policy should be 
adopted afterward. The Bush administration held fast to the position that all 
quantitative restrictions permanently end on April  1 . Surprisingly little support 117  The Waning Influence of Big Steel? 
emerged in the steel industry for another extension of the VRA program. Only 
the USW, Bethlehem Steel, and the specialty steel sector publicly supported 
an extension. The balance of  the integrated industry, extremely disappointed 
with its experience with the VRA  after  1988, expressed  no public interest 
whatsoever in an e~tension.~”  Instead, these steel firms announced repeatedly 
that they would file another round of AD and CVD petitions, but this time they 
vowed to pursue them to final decisions. The industry, in other words, threat- 
ened that it would try to obtain the definitive AD and CVD duties that would 
provide significant and lasting protection. 
The decision of the industry to forgo any public lobbying for a VRA is prob- 
ably the best indicator of the diminished clout of the steel industry. As men- 
tioned earlier, a politically strong industry is more likely to pursue an escape 
clause or a VRA. Both avenues are characterized by considerable presidential 
discretion so that political muscle can be brought to bear on the final decision. 
A politically weak industry, on the other hand, is more likely to exploit the 
“technical” track to protection  and will use the AD and CVD processes  in 
which political clout is almost entirely irrelevant. 
The steel users also were largely absent from the discussions at this stage. 
This reflects two factors. The coalition brought together in 1989 to form CA- 
SUM was inherently unstable. The interests of the members intersected essen- 
tially only on steel import policy. The group had no reason to continue exten- 
sive cooperation on other public policy issues once a steel policy was in place 
in 1989. In addition, a major argument of CASUM was that the steel industry 
should not lobby for VRAs but instead use the normal trade remedy apparatus. 
If the industry was intent on filing AD and CVD cases, Caterpillar and other 
CASUM members could not credibly complain. 
In the event, the VRA program expired on April 1, 1992, and the multilateral 
steel negotiations ended with no agreement. As promised, the Bush administra- 
tion refused to take special action, and also as promised, the steel industry filed 
over 80 AD and CVD petitions in the summer of 1992. These petitions, as did 
many rounds of AP petitions before, involved the United States’ major trading 
partners, including Mexico, Canada, Japan, and the European Community. 
The superficial parallels to the situation in 1984 are striking. Once again a 
free-trade-oriented  Republican president faced reelection  while a torrent of 
steel industry AP petitions wound through the bureaucracy. Further complicat- 
ing the political calculus, Bush faced both a weak economy and a much more 
formidable opponent in Clinton than Reagan had faced with Mondale in 1984. 
Many veteran industry observers fully expected that the administration would 
reach an accommodation with the steel industry before the AP process worked 
30. The integrated firms’ privare position insistence is somewhat in dispute. A staff member 
insists that the firms had no interest in an extension. However, an official at the Trade Representa- 
tive’s office insists that the industry was in favor of extension until December 1991 when it became 
clear that they would not obtain it from the Bush administration. 118  Michael 0.  Moore 
to a conclu~ion.~’  The implicit assumption, of course, was that high final AD 
duties were  near  certain and that the  administration would be  unwilling to 
allow them to be imposed. These expectations for a negotiated outcome grew 
even stronger as the polls continued to show President  Bush lagging behind 
Governor Clinton. A negotiated outcome was even more likely if the political 
clout of the industry had remained undiminished, given the tight presidential 
election. 
If the steel industry wanted to use the AP petitions to inject steel policy into 
the  1992 presidential campaign and pressure President Bush, they failed ut- 
terly. President Bush held firm to his pledge not to extend any special deals to 
the industry despite rising doubts about his chances for reelection. The fact that 
George Bush never again tried to appeal to the steel sector is emblematic of the 
industry’s decreased political importance in American presidential elections. 
With the election of Bill Clinton, a politically powerful integrated steel in- 
dustry might have used the opportunity to force steel import policy into policy 
avenues with political  discretion and away from the AP process. Instead, the 
industry  pressed  the AP petitions.32 Provisional  AD and  CVD duties  were 
placed on most of the products covered in the petitions in January  1993 imme- 
diately after the Clinton administration took office. 
These preliminary duties meant that foreign firms were required to post a 
bond equal to the estimated margins, so that imported steel prices rose at once. 
This in turn allowed the integrated firms, by far the most important domestic 
producers of flat-rolled products, to raise prices significantly on their domestic 
sales, a goal that had eluded them since slow economic growth began in 1990. 
The firms were able to credibly raise the prices, even though the duties were 
only provisional, since market participants fully expected that the duties would 
become permanent. 
The AD process reached its next important juncture in June 1993 when the 
DOC announced average final duties of 36 percent on flat-rolled products. As 
expected in AD and CVD cases, individual product and country duties were 
highly divergent and ranged from under 2 percent to 109 percent. These final 
estimates  pleased  steel  industry  representatives  since  many  were  sharply 
higher than the January 1993 preliminary duties. 
The cases then proceeded to the ITC for a final ruling on material injury. 
The presumption of most observers was that the industry  would win at this 
final stage. However, on July 27, 1993, the ITC ruled affirmatively on 32 cases 
and negatively on 41 petitions, which translated into about roughly half of the 
imports in value terms. 
3  I. E.g., see the comments of long-time steel editor George McManus in Iron Age (May 1992). 
32. After the petitions were filed, a number of foreign suppliers expressed serious interest in a 
negotiated settlement. E.g., firms  and governments from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Fin- 
land, Germany, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, and New Zealand all submitted proposals to the DOC 
in May  1993 for “suspension agreements” whereby the firms would agree to raise their prices to 
preempt duties. The DOC did not seriously consider the proposals. 119  The Waning Influence of Big Steel? 
Carbon steel plate received by far the most comprehensive protection-only 
France, Italy, and Korea escaped with no definitive final duties. Over 71 per- 
cent of plate imports were covered by final definitive duties which ranged from 
1.4 to  109 percent. Similarly, 83 percent of corrosion-resistant steel imports 
were faced  with  affirmative  duties.  In contrast,  all petitions  involving hot- 
rolled products and all but three of the cold-rolled petitions (representing 34 
percent of imports) were dismissed. 
While the commission recognized that the industry was suffering injury in 
the period under review, the majority  of  the ITC’s members concluded that 
dumped and subsidized imports were not important causes of  domestic prob- 
lems in much of  the industry. Instead, the majority of  the ITC reasoned that 
price competition among domestic firms was the main source of difficulty and 
pointed out that imports were sold at prices that were often higher than domes- 
tic sources (USITC 1993). The ITC’s argument closely echoes that of the 1984 
serious injury determination. In that earlier decision, the ITC had also ruled 
that domestic competition was the main cause of  injury in the four minimill- 
dominated sectors. These two ITC decisions, in other words, reflected a grow- 
ing recognition that a newly fragmented and highly competitive U.S. steel mar- 
ket makes oligopolistic price discipline very difficult to maintain. 
The outcomes  took  most observers almost entirely by  surprise and were 
highly  disappointing  to  the  industry.  The best  indicator  of  the  shock  was 
the fall of major steel firm stock prices. For example, U.S. Steel, Bethlehem, 
and National Steel stock prices fell  13, 21, and 27 percent, respectively, on 
July 22. 
In sum, the spotty protection (final high duties placed on some countries’ 
products and all provisional  duties removed on others) meant that the inte- 
grated industry could count on very little significant comprehensive protection 
from these cases. The duties’ lasting effect will depend in large part on whether 
countries not covered by  final duties will step in to replace the displaced im- 
ports. If they do so, the domestic price effects of the duties may be minimal. 
For the first time in about 25 years,  steel had clearly and publicly  lost a 
major trade policy debate. The industry’s most important trump card, the threat 
of final and near-prohibitive duties obtained through the nondiscretionary AD 
and CVD process, had been played, and little had come of it. The industry was 
able to raise prices and garner significant short-term increases in profits during 
the period  of  provisional  duties, but the  strategy did not lead to permanent 
comprehensive pr~tection.~~ 
33. Some observers have noted that the industry still was a net beneficiary of the trade litigation. 
In particular, the temporary price increases made possible by the prospect of final duties more than 
paid for the legal fees associated with the cases, according to Gary Horlick, a noted trade lawyer 
in Washington (Cato Institute conference on foreign steel, November 1993).  This strategy may not 
work in the future, however. The use of AD and CVD petitions may no longer be such a credible 
threat in the future, so that domestic buyers may be much more reluctant to accept price increases 
when only provisional duties are in place. 120  Michael 0.  Moore 
It is difficult, however, to assess the precise political implications of the re- 
sults of these cases. As repeatedly emphasized in this paper, the AD and CVD 
process are largely  apolitical. Consequently, the disappointing results  of  the 
cases do not directly imply that the industry has less political power than in 
previous  years. Nonetheless, the cases would likely have never reached the 
final ITC decision stage if the industry were still a dominant political force. 
The inability to force a comprehensive political solution to the cases is per- 
haps even more striking given that a Democrat was once again president. One 
might have expected that President Clinton would have made every effort to 
reach out to help the integrated steel industry and, by implication, the USW. 
Instead, it appears that the Clinton administration, like the Republican admin- 
istration before it, is not inclined to pursue a policy of import restrictions to 
help Big 
2.6  Conclusion 
The U.S. integrated steel industry has long enjoyed unusual success influ- 
encing import policy. Steel producers and the steelworkers’ union have man- 
aged to gain special trade regimes in 1969, 1977, 1982, 1984, and 1989. The 
most important sources of this political strength have been the cohesiveness of 
the coalition in favor of import restraints, the number of potential voters in the 
steel sector, and the legal and rhetorical advantage gained by massive foreign 
government intervention. 
The cohesiveness of industry players when lobbying for protection and the 
relative  disorganization of  domestic interests harmed  by  steel barriers have 
been particularly important. The main source of  the coalition’s cohesiveness 
has been a small number of major integrated producers that traditionally have 
dominated the industry. This market structure arose out of the scale economies 
of traditional steel operations where fixed costs acted as a barrier to entry for 
new domestic rivals. The large scale of operations also created a highly geo- 
graphically  concentrated  production  pattern.  Consequently,  thousands  of 
workers were consolidated in a relatively  small number of  production sites. 
This translated into a highly powerful political presence in a limited number 
of states and congressional districts. This market structure is in sharp contrast 
to domestic steel users who  are widely  dispersed  geographically  and  must 
overcome significant transaction cost to organize an effective counterweight to 
the integrated sector. 
34. Another indication of  the integrated industry’s reduced clout is reported by  the Finunciul 
Times. On October 6,  1993, interested parties were invited to the White House to discuss their 
positions on a proposed new MSA. Not only did the U.S. trade representative meet first with a 
group of  steel users about the proposal, when steel producers were invited in, the traditional inte- 
grated producers were joined by Kenneth Iverson of Nucor, a committed and aggressive free trader. 
The presence of both steel users and Iverson is a clear indication that the integrated steel producers 
no longer speak with complete authority on steel issues in US.  policy-making circles. 121  The Waning Influence of Big Steel? 
The sheer number of steel sector employees also contributed to the political 
strength of  the steel industry. Over half a million Americans were employed 
in the steel sector in  1974. This voting power was further increased by  the 
geographical concentration in states with large electoral votes (Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, and Indiana), which gave the steel sector unusual clout in presidential 
elections. 
Finally, extensive foreign government steel sector intervention (in Japan dur- 
ing the 1960s and in Europe and the developing world in the 1970s and 1980s) 
provided the U.S. industry with major political leverage. Most important, gov- 
ernment intervention meant  that  steel firms could credibly threaten foreign 
firms with legal action under US.  trade provisions. The nondiscretionary na- 
ture of the U.S. unfair trade process meant that the president would be faced 
with the prospect of  bureaucratically  imposed high duties on foreign allies 
if special deals were not negotiated. The integrated sector also gained major 
rhetorical advantages from the foreign practices since it diverted attention away 
from domestic shortcomings, including slowness to adopt modem technolog- 
ies and high labor costs. 
Despite past success and strength, there is evidence that this influence may 
have finally begun to wane. The unsatisfactory  1989 extension of the VRA 
program and the inability to obtain significant import restraints in 1993 both 
point to lessened, though still formidable, clout. The weakened political posi- 
tion of the integrated sector also allowed domestic steel-using industries to 
play a more prominent role in import policy. Most important, steel users orga- 
nized an ad hoc coalition during the fight a VRA extension in 1989. The pres- 
ence of domestic manufacturers (especially exporters) arguing against import 
barriers acted as an important counterweight to protectionist arguments from 
the integrated sector. In the event, the VRAs were relaxed and became largely 
nonbinding for the last two years of  the program. While this one-issue user 
coalition may be inherently unstable over an extended period, it did provide an 
important impetus for a liberalized steel trade policy. 
The reasons for the integrated steel sector’s drop in political clout are linked 
directly to the fundamentally changed market structure of the U.S. steel sector. 
First, political power has waned simply because of the  drop in steel sector 
employment to only 140,000 in 1992. The much smaller workforce means that 
fewer politicians have an interest in attracting steelworker votes. Second, the 
industry is radically different from 20 years ago. Large integrated firms are 
less and less dominant domestically but at the same time are more competitive 
internationally. The improvement in competitiveness is largely due to rising 
labor productivity, increasing use of modem steel production techniques such 
as continuous casting, and a significantly weakened dollar. This improved eco- 
nomic competitiveness paradoxically has contributed to a weakened political 
position for the industry since it undercuts the argument that the steel industry 
is in need of special import policy. 
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of minimills in the U.S. economy. Technological  advances have lowered the 
minimum efficient scale of steel-making operations in a number of  product 
categories. This has allowed minimills to push the integrated mills entirely 
out of certain product lines and threaten them in the remaining high-end steel 
products. These changes mean that even if the integrated steel firms can suc- 
cessfully litigate unfair trade cases, these large firms will continue to be under 
intense competitive pressures from domestic minimills. 
Steel industry strategies to secure government intervention will change dra- 
matically in the future as the industry continues to restructure.  Steel firms, 
including many minimills, will likely use unfair trade petitions as long as sig- 
nificant government steel sector intervention continues abroad. From the inte- 
grated sector’s viewpoint, this strategy is less and less attractive. Such import 
barriers raise profits to all domestic steel firms and simply accelerate the on- 
slaught of the more efficient minimills. In the future, this will be true even in 
flat-rolled products that have been the last market sector dominated by inte- 
grated producers. The integrated mills will consequently have strong incentives 
to direct their lobbying efforts to improve their position vis-A-vis the minimills 
rather than try to erect import barriers. 
Hints of a possible change in strategy have begun to appear. Certainly the 
most important recent example is the strong effort to obtain government relief 
on health and pension costs of early retirees in the steel industry. Early versions 
of President Clinton’s health care reform would lead to an important reduction 
in these legacy costs. This would be one of the most important ways to immedi- 
ately help the integrated sector compete with the minimills, whose relatively 
young workforces present no such massive burden. The integrated firms also 
obtained an exemption from President Clinton’s proposed BTU tax for the use 
of coke as a feedstock. If  Congress had implemented this tax, the integrated 
industry’s exemption would have helped it compete with the minimills. 
Direct lobbying struggles with the minimills, however, will be much more 
problematic than with importers. Most important, since minimills are domestic 
firms, they will have domestic allies. The integrated sector will therefore face 
a struggle with other domestic interests rather than lobby for protection from 
“unfair” foreign competition. Further, the minimills are often portrayed as clas- 
sic American  success  stories-small,  innovative  entrepreneurs  fighting  the 
lumbering, bureaucratic steel behemoths. This gives them a rhetorical advan- 
tage in lobbying struggles with the traditional steel mills. 
As the minimills grow in importance, we will also likely see a growth in 
their political strength. If the minimills continue their technological advances, 
we might even see a growing impatience with a lack of export opportunities 
abroad. In fact, it is conceivable that in the not too distant future, the most 
politically powerful steel firms in the United States might focus their lobbying, 
not on barriers  on  imported  steel, but  instead  on a reduction  in protection 
abroad. 
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will likely continue well into the future. The political muscle of the industry 
will remain formidable. Nevertheless, steel sector lobbying will likely take on 
a very different form than in the past. The days of integrated producers and 
the steelworkers’ union consistently forcing special trade deals on reluctant 
administrations are almost assuredly gone forever. 
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Comment  William C. Lane 
By selecting the subject of steel protection in the 1980s, Michael Moore has 
chosen one of the most interesting examples of the political economy. While it 
is unlikely  this subject will ever find its way  into a made-for-TV movie, the 
plot does have a certain Shakespearean appeal. 
Imagine: The curtain opens with the king (U.S. steel industry) at the height 
of his power. He has just won a long sought after prize (comprehensive import 
protection). But as events would have it, the prize is a mixed blessing. The king 
discovers that his chief competitors (minimills and foreign steel companies) 
are also benefiting from his prize. Even more disturbing is the realization that 
possession  of the prize is fostering great unrest among his countrymen (cus- 
tomers). In fact, his countrymen are so upset that they form an army (Coalition 
of American  Steel-Using  Manufacturers)  and challenge the king’s authority. 
After a heated battle, the curtain falls, with the king’s power diminished, the 
prize lost, and the king’s competitors stronger than ever. 
Whether this drama qualifies as comedy or tragedy is uncertain, but it does 
serve to illustrate what happened to the U.S. steel industry during the 1980s. 
In 1984, the political influence of the U.S. steel industry was at a new high. By 
convincing  the U.S. government  to impose steel quotas on imports from 19 
countries and the European Community, Big Steel had won the type of com- 
prehensive import protection that it had long sought. All that remained was to 
extend the quota coverage to include the few missing countries (Canada and 
Sweden) and take steps to ensure the quota program does not expire. 
The duration of the new trade regime was initially set at five years. But most 
trade practitioners believed  convincing Congress to extend the program for 
another five years would be relatively easy. After all, the steel industry’s politi- 
cal clout was well established. Besides, the protectionist tool being sought- 
voluntary  restraint  agreements  (VRAs)-was  an  unfamiliar  concept  which 
largely escaped public scrutiny. Finally, foreign countries had a big incentive to 
support the new VRA program because VRAs not only exempted participating 
countries from US. trade laws but rewarded them with a share of the “quota 
rent.” 
William C.  Lane  is international  governmental affairs manager for Caterpillar, Inc. During 
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In spite of these factors favoring renewal, the  1988-89  VRA debate had a 
most unexpected outcome. After a bruising political fight with a newly formed 
coalition of U.S. steel consumers, the steel industry was only able to win an 
abbreviated VRA extension that was, in many ways, little more than a placebo. 
How did the politics of protectionism change so quickly? Did market forces 
overwhelm the steel industry’s hold on Washington? Or was it the growth of 
new, more-efficient minimills that upset the political balance? What about steel 
users? After being on the political sideline for 30 years, why did they suddenly 
feel compelled to aggressively challenge the steel industry’s call for more pro- 
tection? 
Moore’s paper does an excellent job of answering these questions by exam- 
ining the economic and political dynamics that eventually invalidated the steel 
industry’s claim for industry-specific protection. He provides a thorough his- 
tory of U.S. steel programs since the 1960s. His analyses of trade flows, pro- 
duction output, and capacity levels allow for a complete understanding of the 
effectiveness of  the various protectionist  schemes employed  since  1969. He 
also avoids the common pitfall  of  viewing  the steel industry  from only the 
integrated mills’ point of view; the rise of minimills and resurrection of recon- 
stituted mills are important elements of his paper. 
What sets Moore’s paper apart from other studies of the steel industry, how- 
ever, is his in-depth understanding of the events that changed the “politics of 
protectionism.” Quota-induced shortages in  1987 and 1988 forced steel users 
from the political  sidelines. Once that happened, the political battlefield that 
the steel industry had learned to master changed dramatically. No longer could 
Congress view protection for the steel industry as a domestic versus foreign 
issue. With steel users engaged in the debate, Congress was in the uncomfort- 
able position of having to favor one U.S. industry over another. In many ways, 
the  1988-89  VRA debate was more a fight about U.S. competitiveness than 
about the evils of protectionism. 
The compromise that emerged in  1989 reflected this new political  reality. 
New steel quotas were extended for two and a half years not five. The new 
VRA  program  provided  a user-friendly  short-supply  mechanism. Most im- 
portant, the new quotas were so large that they had little or no impact on inter- 
national commerce. 
The price the steel industry paid for this illusion of protection was signifi- 
cant. In exchange for new VRAs, the steel industry had to agree to exempt 
foreign steel producers from U.S. trade laws. In other words, the industry had 
to give up all of its leverage to discipline foreign subsidies and unfair pricing. 
Subsequent  actions by  the  steel industry  further confirmed the  extent to 
which the steel industry lost its bid for special protection. When VRAs finally 
expired in March 1992, Big Steel abandoned all efforts to win industry-specific 
protection from Congress. Instead, the steel industry made good on its long- 
standing threat to file scores of AD and CVD trade cases. 
Surprisingly, few in government or industry objected to this new develop- 127  The Waning Influence of Big Steel? 
ment. After all, Big Steel was availing itself of the same trade rules that apply 
to any other industry. The U.S. response was merely to evaluate the cases and 
render  the appropriate decisions. Rather than creating havoc on the interna- 
tional trading  system as some steel industry executives predicted, the cases 
were handled in stride. Of the 84 trade cases filed, the steel industry won 32. 
This outcome served to confirm the view that normal trade remedies did in fact 
work for the steel industry. Since then there has been no serious suggestion 
that the US. steel industry needs or deserves industry-specific protection. 
While the paper was comprehensive, a few issues deserve more attention 
from Moore. 
1. Why didn’t consumers of other protected industries (i.e., textiles, autos, 
and sugar) challenge protection as aggressively as steel users did in 1988-89? 
What was unique about steel during this period? 
2.  Why did the steel industry accept such a lopsided compromise in 1989? 
Wouldn’t the threat of a massive filing of trade cases dampen imports far more 
than a 30-month extension of nonbinding quotas? 
3.  Did the 1988-89 steel debate discredit VRAs as a trade policy tool? Prior 
to 1989, VRAs were ballyhooed as a managed trade tool that really worked. 
After the VRA debate, this “gray area” trade remedy was rarely proposed. In 
1993 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade even disallowed VRAs from 
being used as a part of a safeguard action. 
While Moore’s paper will not become a Shakespearean classic, it is an im- 
portant contribution to the study of  the political economy and how it affects 
trade policy. It should be required reading for any serious student of business 
and government. 
Comment  James R. Markusen 
The steel industry is certainly an excellent choice for a case study of the politi- 
cal economy of trade policy. It is an industry that has had significant difficulties 
in many countries over the last several decades, been a focus of an industrial 
strategy in others, and been a source of considerable political debate in many 
more countries than just the United States. Next to agriculture, steel was per- 
haps the most distressed, regulated, andor subsidized industry in many coun- 
tries during the decades of the 1960s through the  1980s. Indeed, in many re- 
spects an international focus for the paper might have been preferable. I believe 
that the exclusive U.S.-centric focus of the paper leads to shortcomings, as I 
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will suggest. While there are many fine aspects to this paper, my comments 
will focus on what I regard as the two difficulties. 
Moore gives us a rather stark view of  the U.S.  steel industry in the three 
decades of  the  1960s through  1980s. He characterizes the industry as using 
outdated technology  and management techniques and awarding overly gener- 
ous labor contracts. Minor reference is made to the nature of world steel mar- 
kets, foreign subsidies, foreign development strategies, and a badly overvalued 
U.S. dollar in the early  1980s. The U.S. steel industry is portrayed as a rent 
seeker, resistant to structural change and modernization. 
It may well be true that the U.S. industry suffered from self-inflicted ills. It 
may  also be true that it engaged in aggressive rent-seeking behavior and re- 
sisted  structural change. I have few problems  with  these notions.  However, 
economic theory does lead us to expect efficient firms, and so it would be good 
to have a convincing explanation, not just an assertion of industry inefficiency. 
But this is likely beyond the scope of the paper. 
Based on my limited knowledge of  the industry, I am concerned with the 
author’s neglect of the role of the worldwide steel industry’s problems and for- 
eign government steel programs.  I believe that the paper presents a distorted 
view of the situation and possibly arrives at incorrect conclusions. 
I am sorry that I have not had time to go back and review the history of the 
industry, but my general recollections of  the 1960s through 1980s are as fol- 
lows. First, the world steel industry was characterized by tremendous excess 
capacity. Indeed, there were significant additions to capacity in some countries 
as governments, as in Brazil, targeted the steel industry as part of a develop- 
ment strategy. Many countries (particularly European) were heavily subsidiz- 
ing  production  and  capital  expenditures  for  modernization  and  expansion. 
Government ownership allowed huge losses to be passed on to taxpayers (e.g., 
British Steel). In these respects, the steel industry is quite different from some 
of the other industries analyzed at this conference, such as automobiles. 
In general, it seems that during the 1960s through 1980s, there was in fact 
very substantial subsidization occurring outside the United States and, I am 
sure, substantial dumping into the U.S. market by foreign firms desperate for 
any sales at or above marginal cost. Subsidized sales and dumping really were 
occurring and were not simply figments of the U.S. industry’s public relations 
campaign. 
We could take the view of many economists that we should welcome foreign 
subsidies, thank them for selling to us below costs, and not worry about the 
domestic industry and its workers. Or we could take the present author’s ap- 
proach,  implicitly  dismiss the  relevance  of  foreign  subsidies, and conclude 
only on the basis of the poor performance of the domestic industry that protec- 
tion is unjustified. 
But I think that those economists’ arguments are really beside the point. If 
foreign governments are subsidizing and if foreign firms are dumping, then it 
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This is proper and legal under U.S. laws and General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) rules. If economists do not like antidumping (AD) and counter- 
vailing duty (CVD) laws, perhaps our criticism should be directed at them and 
not always at the firms which avail themselves of these legal options. 
The author sees a moribund  industry facing “efficient foreign producers,” 
obtaining relief through political manipulation. There is considerable innuendo 
to the effect that such relief is undeserved. Yet the author himself seems uncer- 
tain about this at several points. He states on several occasions that the Interna- 
tional Trade Commission (ITC) processes on AD and CVD are relatively apo- 
litical. During the period, the ITC found in favor of  the industry on a great 
many occasions. It appears that the ITC found something that is being missed 
here. Clearly, not all of the foreign producers were efficient. 
The author states that “the steel industry, in other words, has obtained spe- 
cial trade policy treatment unavailable to nearly all other domestic industries.” 
First of all, that is almost certainly not true (depending on the meaning of 
“nearly all other”)-agriculture,  textiles, clothing, shoes, autos, shipping, and 
even petroleum  in the  1950s and  1960s come to mind.  Second, the  author 
needs to deal seriously  with the possibility  that there was something going 
on in the world that justified relief  under U.S. and GATT law,  if  not under 
economic theory. 
This brings me to my second main point. Since relief for the industry was 
unjustified on any legal or economic grounds in the author’s mind, he attempts 
to explain the industry success in seeking relief up to 1989 in terms of a tradi- 
tional lobbying model. In part, high concentration and unionization are charac- 
teristics that win protection in such a worldview. 
This model has great appeal to economists. My problem here is that it al- 
most always performs poorly in empirical tests. Measures of lobbying power 
such as concentration and unionization  are not good explainers of protection 
in the United States. Industries that are in trouble are the ones that  tend to 
receive protection. Let me refer to some results from the work of Daniel Trefler, 
including a recent paper (Trefler 1993). 
Trefler finds that special interest models of trade policy perform only moder- 
ately well in empirical tests. By several criteria, concentration and number of 
firm variables are not economically important. In fact, he finds that none of the 
lobbying cost variables are important. 
Trefler notes in his work that special interest lobbying models cannot explain 
the high levels of protection in industries such as textiles, clothing, lumber, and 
leather. These industries are neither highly concentrated nor unionized, employ 
less-skilled labor, face high rates of unemployment, and operate under decreas- 
ing returns. Trefler sees the explanation more in terms of a public interest group 
approach, or what I would term a “conservative social welfare function,” to use 
Max Corden’s term. The public opposes protection unless it helps workers in 
distressed industries and redistributes income to the lower-paid, less-skilled 
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Trefler arrives at several conclusions which are consistent with results that I 
have seen elsewhere: (1) Concentration and other lobbying variables are eco- 
nomically unimportant; scale is important but negatively related to protection. 
(2)  Unionization is negatively related to protection, although the sign switches 
to positive  if textiles  are omitted. (3) High protection  is found in industries 
with significant import penetration, semiskilled workers, and high unemploy- 
ment rates. 
I  would  like to offer an alternative explanation, consistent  with the same 
facts Moore presents for the steel industry. First, the steel industry, although 
inefficient with overpaid workers, was subject to competition from heavily sub- 
sidized foreign firms. Significant dumping was occumng by firms with huge 
losses and excess capacity. For part of the period (particularly the early 198Os), 
the U.S. dollar was badly overvalued. 
Second, subsidies and dumping were  deemed to exist and to be causing 
injury by the ITC (though not the only cause of the industry’s troubles) and 
relief was granted on many AD and CVD cases. 
Third,  comprehensive  quotas were  introduced,  not  because  of  the  great 
political clout of the industry, but because they  were much preferred  to the 
tangled web of duties that would otherwise be legitimately won through AD 
and CVD cases. 
Fourth, protection was withdrawn in the 1990s, not because the industry lost 
the clout (that it may never have had), but simply because protection was no 
longer justified. This change was partly due to the rationalization of the U.S. 
industry, partly due to reduced capacity and subsidization in Europe and else- 
where, and partly to the stronger depreciation of the U.S. real exchange rate 
after 1985. The withdrawal of protection, like its institution, is consistent with 
a public interest or conservative social welfare function theory of trade policy. 
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Comment  Michael H. Moskow 
Moore’s main argument is that the change in the domestic structure of the U.S. 
steel industry has led to significantly reduced political influence by large inte- 
grated producers. Industry fragmentation has developed because of the growth 
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of minimills, reconstituted mills, and foreign ownership or  joint venturing with 
U.S. firms. Whereas, historically, a small number of large integrated producers 
executed considerable influence on U.S. policymakers,  Moore believes  that 
the above structural changes and resulting fragmentation have caused a major 
reduction in the integrated producers’ political power. 
Although Moore provides considerable support for his main thesis, he does 
not address the underlying  reason  that U.S.  integrated steel producers have 
sought protection from the federal government. Is it primarily because there is 
worldwide excess capacity in steel caused by  extensive government subsidies 
in other countries or is it because of inefficiencies particular to the U.S. pro- 
ducer? Since U.S. government policy has been based on the assumption that 
foreign government subsidies and excess capacity is the problem, Moore could 
provide an extremely useful service by analyzing this issue and providing his 
views. My personal view is that subsidies are the underlying  problem, but I 
would welcome a thorough analysis of this issue. While serving as deputy U.S. 
trade representative in the Bush administration, one of my major responsibili- 
ties was to negotiate a multilateral steel agreement (MSA) covering over 30 
countries. The main purpose of the agreement from the U.S. standpoint was to 
eliminate or significantly reduce foreign government  subsidies (mostly from 
European countries) to their steel producers. In return, duties on steel would 
be reduced  to zero, thus increasing access of foreign producers to the U.S. 
market.  New dispute resolution  procedures were drafted that would have re- 
solved rapidly any claimed violations of  the MSA through a process culminat- 
ing in binding arbitration. 
We made it clear to our trading partners that President Bush would not ex- 
tend the voluntary restraint agreement (VRA) on steel that was scheduled to 
expire on March 3 1, 1992. The parties made strenuous but unsuccessful efforts 
to reach agreement on the MSA before the March 3 1 deadline. 
Some uncertainty  persisted among other countries and within the steel in- 
dustry as to whether President Bush would let the VRAs expire if negotiations 
on the MSA were unsuccessful. The speculation was fueled by Bush’s decision 
to extend for two years on a phase-out basis the VRA for the machine tool 
industry that expired on December 31,  1991. Nevertheless,  no discussion of 
extending the steel VRA ever took place within the Bush administration, and 
only the stainless steel producers attempted to convince the administration and 
Congress to extend their VRA. 
The two key unsolved issues in the MSA negotiations were the level of per- 
mitted subsidies and the process for “consultations” on antidumping cases. We 
had narrowed  the areas for permitted  subsidies significantly  but were never 
able to bridge the gap. The antidumping consultation issue was particularly 
difficult because, in my view, it masked an underlying philosophical difference 
between the United States and other countries. The MSA did not change the 
U.S. antidumping laws, but other countries seem to believe that consultations 
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cases filed or flowing through the full process for handling cases. There were 
no objections to the U.S. trade representative’s hearing other countries’ views 
on individual cases, but this could not in any way interfere with the legislated 
process that the Department of Commerce and International Trade Commis- 
sion (ITC) followed in deciding these cases. If this was the extent of “consulta- 
tions,” then what benefit would this be to other countries? 
Another important issue in negotiations was the phase-out of existing sub- 
sidies, particularly in reference to what were called “countries in transition.” 
While we wanted to encourage Eastern European countries to continue shifting 
from socialistic to market economies, we had to find ways to temporarily ease 
the  impact of removing  their  steel  subsidies. Another  example  was Brazil, 
which was attempting to privatize  its  steel industry but needed  a transition 
period of continued protection to avoid massive dislocations. VRAs or some 
form of temporary quota for these countries in transition was part of the negoti- 
ations. 
Following the break-off of negotiations in March 1992, the U.S. integrated 
steel producers filed 84 countervailing duty and antidumping cases that were 
subsequently largely decided against the steel producers by the ITC. The pro- 
ducers are currently appealing the ITC decisions. Strong attempts were again 
made to agree on an MSA in late 1993 as part of the Uruguay Round GATT 
negotiations.  The round includes the elimination of  steel tariffs, which  was 
part of the MSA, but negotiations on the key provisions of the MSA reducing 
subsidies in the steel industry were again unsuccessful. 